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THE QUALITIES OF MERCY: MAXIMIZING THE
IMPACT OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENTt
DanielJ. Steinbock*
Resettlement in the US. bestows a life changing benefit on thousands of overseas
refugees. Because American refugee acceptance can never reach more than a tiny
fraction of the world's millions of persecuted or oppressed, howeve, allocating this
bounty requires the US. to choose the lucky few from the worthy many. Since the
creation in 1980 of a permanent program of refugee resettlement, three dfferent,
and often conflicting, purposes have contended for its trove of immigration-like
admissions slots. These are the removal of people from danger or hardship, the fur-
therance of a cluster of foreign policy objectives, and the facilitation of such
traditional immigration aims as family reunion or cultural connection to the US.
This Article examines these selection grounds from practical, political, and phi-
losophical perspectives, beginning with a consideration of the kinds of hardship
that might warrant removal to the U.S. Given that refugee resettlement can reach
only a tiny fraction of the oppressed, endangered, or suffering people in the world,
this Article proposes that we concentrate on those whose admission would have the
greatest positive impact on U.S. interests, the refugees themselves, or the popula-
tions from which they are drawn. This priority includes the most seriously
threatened, but also covers those whose admission would provide some other sec-
ondary gains beyond the primary benefit of removing a person from danger or
hardship.
In light of the context and process dynamics of refugee resettlement, the Article rec-
ommends several ways of maximizing its impact. These include burden-sharing
active acceptance of human rights activists, more selection directly from countries
of persecution, and greater geographic concentration. The Article also suggests
that the only family reunion grounds for selection be that of spouses or parents and
their minor children, that cultural connections to the U.S. generally should not
count in refugee resettlement, and that certain foreign policy purposes be eschewed.
All of these recommendations are made with the aim of making the most of a valu-
able and increasingly scarce life-saving resource.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, as it has for more than twenty years, the United States
admits tens of thousands of "refugees of special humanitarian con-
cern"' from other countries. Those selected are generally allowed
to stay here indefinitely, to adjust to permanent residence status,
and ultimately to become citizens. They are eligible for most public
benefits from the time they arrive.
This relatively little-known program operates in addition to, and
largely independent of, both ordinary immigration and the several
forms of sanctuary potentially available to foreigners who manage
to enter U.S. territory: asylum, withholding of deportation, or
Temporary Protected Status. These other forms of relief are avail-
able only to applicants who have already reached the U.S on their
own.2 By contrast, overseas refugee selection chooses, in theory,
from the global universe of those facing persecution or other dan-
ger in their present locales. Moreover, the U.S. is barred, in
international and domestic law, from returning arriving "refu-
gees"-people with a well-founded fear of persecution-to places
where they would be persecuted. There is no corresponding legal
obligation to resettle any person from abroad, and none of these
refugees has any entitlement to resettlement.
The events of September 11 provide an occasion (or perhaps an
excuse) to reconsider overseas refugee selection. After those at-
tacks, refugee resettlement was immediately suspended for two
months to be sure that terrorists were not among those being ad-
mitted. Admissions resumed quite slowly thereafter, and only about
28,000 places in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal year quotas of 70,000
refugees were filled.
This federal review of refugee resettlement, however, soon
broadened into a thoroughgoing examination of "the underlying
1. Immigration and NationalityAct§ 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (1999).
2. The individual alien comes forward, claiming to fall within the terms of statutes
giving "refugees" a right to asylum or withholding of deportation, (or some less commonly
used status), and the government "adjudicates" the claim. Although decided on a group
basis, even Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a temporary right to remain due to dangers
in a particular country, is given to those who have already arrived here. These reactive forms
of protection are what usually come to mind when people think of American refugee policy.
3. Christopher Marquis, Since Attacks, U.S. Admits Fewer Refugees, N. Y. TiMES, Oct. 30,
2002, at A14 (27,113 refugees resettled in FY 2002). U.S. Dept. of State, I U.S. Refuge Admis-
sions Program News, No. 2, at 2 (Nov. 7, 2003) (28,455 refugees resettled in FY 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/26158.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
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suppositions, purposes and potential of the program."4 This Article
aims to contribute to that process. At the least, September 11 will
mark a shift in foreign policy priorities that will make itself felt in
refugee resettlement.5 At best, however, it will prompt a more effec-
tive use of a scarce life-saving resource.
In numerical terms, with the exception of 2002 and 2003, over-
seas refugee selection historically has constituted the largest part of
total American refugee reception. In fiscal year 2001, 68,426 peo-
ple were resettled in the U.S.6 By contrast, asylum officers granted
some 20,487 asylum cases that year, representing approximately
27,000 people.7 From 1985 to 2001 the annual level of refugee ad-
missions ranged from a high of 132,000 in 1992 to a low of 62,000
in 1986.6 In total over 2.5 million refugees have been brought here
since 1975.' A few other countries have a similar kind of overseas
refugee program, but the size and regularity of the United States'
makes it unique. In 2001, for example, of the 92,000 refugees re-
settled worldwide, the United States took over 68,000 (75%). 'o
Canada was the next-largest receiving country, with 10,800."
Compared with the alternatives available to people who already
have been forced to flee, and to others who face daily suffering and
hardship in their homelands, American refugee selection is akin to
being touched by an angel.' 2 This is not to say that coming to the
U.S. as a refugee does not bring its own, often overwhelming,
stresses, but many of the world's most disadvantaged would
certainly view it as a godsend.' 3 Indeed, millions of people who are
4. Bill Frelick, Rethinking U.S. Refugee Admissions: Quantity and Quality, in WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 2002 28 (U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, 2002).
5. See text accompanying infta notes 138-40.
6. U.S. COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2002 276 (2002).
7. Id. at 275. On average, each case is comprised of 1.33 people, and this factor is
used in estimating the number of asylum recipients. In addition, immigration judges
awarded asylum in 7800 cases, to about 10,400 people. Id. at 276.
8. U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, REFUGEE REPORTS, Dec. 1997, at 9.
9. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Fact
Sheet (October 17, 2001)(on file with author). As of August 31, 2001 the exact figure was
2,458,015. Id.
10. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001 UNHCR Population Statistics
(Provisional) Table 4, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ (last visited
June 11, 2002).
11. Id. As a percentage of population, however, both Canada and Australia, with 6,450,
resettle more refugees than the United States.
12. Frelick, supra note 4, at 28 (characterizing refugee resettlement as "a generous act
of enormous benefit to a few fortunate souls").
13. In some cases, refugees misrepresent their circumstances during refugee process-
ing, or even, at the extreme, attempt to buy their way into the program. SeeJames Astill, UN
Staff Ran Refugee Extortion Racket, THE GUARDIAN (London),Jan. 26, 2002, at 17.
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not in such dire circumstances also dream of emigration to the
United States.
4
Who should receive this exceptional bounty? The U.S. is one of
the richest and most secure countries in the world, a magnet for
the less fortunate, and an example to other nations. Large as the
U.S. refugee resettlement program is compared to that of other
countries, it still pales in comparison to the need, however defined.
After all, there are millions of "refugees" in the world, and hun-
dreds of millions of other oppressed and suffering people. Refugee
resettlement requires that the United States "choose the lucky few
from the worthy many.'' This fact raises two basic issues. First, what
absolute numbers--or percentage of overall immigration quotas-
should be devoted to this program? Second, assuming roughly the
same annual number of admissions as in past years, how should the
fewer than 100,000 places be allocated among the millions in
need?
These questions-particularly the latter-have hovered over
refugee resettlement since its institutionalization as a permanent
program by the Refugee Act of 1980. Given the fairly vague statu-
tory standard,'6 and the broad Executive branch discretion in
administering it, refugee resettlement can legally serve a number
of different purposes. One is "rescue," removing persons from
situations that put their lives or well being at serious risk. Almost
since the Refugee Act of 1980 went into effect, however, observers
have complained that the most endangered refugees receive an
insufficient portion of refugee admissions. 7 A second purpose is to
further U.S. foreign policy goals. As discussed in this Article, this
purpose actually encompasses one or more of several distinct for-
14. For example, the FY 2002 diversity visa lottery, see infra note 197 and accompanying
text, received 8.7 million applications. Shredding of Losing Entries in Visa Lottery Halted, WASH.
POST, September 13, 2002 atA6.
15. Patricia M. McDonough, Accept or Reject? What It's About at One University, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at B35 (reviewing JACQUES STEINBERG, THE GATEKEEPERS: INSIDE THE
ADMISSIONS PROCESS OF A PREMIER COLLEGE (2002)). In fact, refugee resettlement bears
several resemblances to college admissions at selective colleges: the pool of qualified appli-
cants far exceeds the existing places; the decision makers therefore pursue policies other
than academic merit by accepting athletes, legacies, and applicants who bring diversity of
various kinds; and the very notion of deciding who is the most "qualified" for acceptance is
highly controversial. Id.
16. See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
17. DENNIS GALLAGHER ET AL., OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN: U.S. REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS SINCE PASSAGE OF THE REFUGEE ACT 9 (1985); Stephen H. Legomsky, The Mak-
ing of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV.
675, 699 (1995); Tahl Tyson, Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Over-
seas Refugee Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns from Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 921 (1990); Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum, and Discretion, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 751 (1992).
[VOL. 36:4
The Qualities of Mery
eign policy objectives. Third, refugee resettlement can also facili-
tate family reunion, recruit skilled labor, or further other
traditional immigration purposes. The tension in refugee resettle-
ment comes from the fact that the first two aims-rescue and
foreign policy-cannot be satisfied elsewhere in U.S. immigration
law. While family reunion or labor skills already dominate normal
immigration, their pull is so strong that they spill over into refugee
selection as well.
The issue with refugee resettlement is that the annual refugee
quota represents a tempting trove of flexible, permanent, immi-
grant-like admissions unconstrained by the usual immigration
requirements. Because the pool of eligible refugees is so large it
somehow seems more acceptable to further other agendas while
engaging in rescue of sorts. After all, if they are all "refugees," and
the U.S. cannot take them all anyway, why not get a foreign policy
or traditional immigration bonus in the selection? In fact, all the
uses of refugee resettlement rely, in effect, on "refugee status plus"
some other factor: refugees plus the most seriously threatened, or
a foreign policy objective, or a traditional immigration concern. It
is simply impossible to choose 100,000 people or less from some 20
million refugees (let alone hundreds of millions of other suffering
people) without making some hard choices. Accepting even a min-
iscule percentage of the world's displaced or oppressed requires
conscious decisions about the best use of those admissions-not
just the processing of the most bureaucratically or politically con-
venient.
The Article begins by describing the present process of overseas
refugee selection. The next three Parts examine the three most
frequent grounds for American refugee selection: rescue, a cluster
of foreign policy aims, and family or cultural connection to the
U.S. In the final Part, the Article proposes a means for evaluating
the various and often-conflicting aims of resettlement: overall
maximization of benefits. From the many people who meet the
minimum refugee qualifications, the U.S. should concentrate on
those whose selection would have the greatest positive impact. This
includes the most seriously threatened, but also covers those whose
admission would provide some other, secondary gains beyond the
primary benefit of removing a person from danger or hardship.
In light of the context and process dynamics of refugee
resettlement, the Article recommends several ways of maximizing
its impact. These include burden-sharing, active selection of
human rights activists, more selection directly from countries of
SUMMER 2003]
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persecution, and greater geographic concentration in refugee
selection. The Article also suggests that the only family reunion
grounds for selection be that of spouses or parents and their minor
children, that cultural connections to the U.S. generally should not
count, and that certain foreign policy objectives be rejected as
bases for refugee resettlement. All of these recommendations are
made with the aim of making the most of a valuable and life-saving
resource-one that seems likely in the immediate future to get
even scarcer.
II. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND ITS CONTEXT
A. History
The United States has been resettling refugees as such since
1948, starting with the Displaced Persons Act of that year, which
covered postwar European refugees."i Later legislation and admin-
istrative action during the 1950's allowed persons fleeing
Communist regimes to enter, largely from Hungary, Poland, Yugo-
slavia, and China. 19 In the 1960's and 1970's Cubans were
welcomed here. Beginning in 1975, the U.S. accepted large num-
bers of Vietnamese and then Lao and Cambodian refugees. 20 The
authority for these resettlement programs came from legislation
specific to a particular crisis, group, or time period,' or, on occa-
sion, Presidential use of the immigration parole power.2 Since
1980, resettlement has been conducted under the authority of the
Refugee Act.23 Overall, since 1975 the U.S. has accepted 2.5 million
overseas refugees, of whom over 75% have been from Indochina
18. See generally, GIL LOESCHER &JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES
AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT (1986). Of course, persons fleeing
conditions in their home countries can enter under other immigration categories if they
qualify, and have certainly done so. In fact, one of the reasons for special refugee legislation
in the period after World War II was the inadequacy of the then-existing national quotas. Id.
at 6-7. The Displaced Persons Act borrowed against future national quotas to permit the
entry of over 400,000 displaced persons by 1951. Michael J. Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in
Immigration Law, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 443, 445 (1998).
19. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 25-67.
20. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1850-1990, 121-38 (1993).
21. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12-17 (1981).
22. Id. at 15.
23. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Star. 102 (1980) (codified as and
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59 (2003)).
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and the former Soviet Union. 4 Under the Refugee Act of 1980,
annual admissions have ranged from 27,000 in 2002 to 207,000 in
1980; the ceiling for FY 2004 is 70,000.25
B. Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 created a permanent process for refu-
gee resettlement. For each fiscal year, the President determines,
after statutorily mandated consultations with Congress, the total
number of such refugees to be admitted, subject to upward revi-
sion for unforeseen emergencies. 26 The initial criteria for selection
are set by annual descriptions of groups-not individuals-of "spe-
cial humanitarian concern" to the United States. The annual
presidential determination allocates numbers of admissions by re-
gion, without specifying which refugees within those regions
should be accepted. 8 People still within their country of nationality
or habitual residence may also qualify as refugees and be resettled
if a presidential determination so designates.
2 9
24. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, supra note 9.
25. Presidential Determination No. 2004-06 of Oct. 21, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,979
(2003) (20,000 places though, are an "unallocated reserve").
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000). For an account of
the background of the Refugee Act and a description of the consultation process, see David
A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91.
See also Anker & Posner, supra note 21. A more recent study concludes that "the annual con-
sultations are at present often proforma and occur far too late in the planning process to be
effective." U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. REFUGEE POLICY: TAKING LEADER-
SHIP 47 (1997).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3), (b), (c)(1). In addition, the person must be otherwise ad-
missible. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1). Admission is made easier by the inapplicability to refugee
applicants of certain grounds of exclusion (labor certification, public charge, and required
documents)) and the Attorney General's authority to waive others (for example, criminal
history, or infectious disease). 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3). Further, an applicant who is firmly
resettled in any foreign country may not be admitted as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1); 8
C.F.R. § 207.1(b), (c) (2003).
28. For example, the Presidential Determination for the 2002 fiscal year allocated
70,000 refugee admissions as follows:
Africa 22,000
East Asia 4,000
Eastern Europe 9,000
Former Soviet Union 17,500
Latin America/Caribbean 3,000
Near East/South Asia 15,000
Presidential Determination No. 02-04 of Nov. 21, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,487 (2001).
29. For fiscal year 2002 these are persons in Vietnam, Cuba and the former Soviet Un-
ion. Id. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a) (42) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (B).
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To be eligible within the designated groups and regions, indi-
viduals must come within the refugee definition, which applies to
overseas refugee processing as well as to claims for political asylum
by those at or within United States borders.30 A "refugee" is defined
as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or ha-
bitual residence and is unwilling or unable to return to that
country because of "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion., 31 Since there are al-
most always many more refugees within the designated regions or
categories than the numbers allocated in the Presidential designa-
tion, further selection is required.32 This process is performed by
the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM), which accepts and screens refugee applications,
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which
makes the actual determination of refugee status. 31 The two de-
partments employ what the State Department calls a "Processing
Priority."34 The priority system specifies which refugees from the
eligible multitudes will be considered for admission to the United
States. The presidential determinations, by controlling the geo-
graphic areas or circumstances from which refugees may be
selected, impose some limits on who is chosen, since those outside
the designated areas or groups are excluded from any considera-
tion. The crux of the selection process, however, lies in the
application of the refugee definition and the 'Processing Priorities.'
C. Processing Priorities
The Processing Priorities themselves are set every year as part of
the annual proposed refugee admissions.35 Priority One (P-i) cov-
ers refugees most in need of resettlement who have been referred
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
30. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 207-208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1158.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A).
32. Martin, supra note 26, at 104.
33. U.S. Department of State, Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2003-Report to
the Congress (Sept. 2002), at http://www.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/2002/13892.
htm#3 (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
34. Id.
35. See U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, Processing Priorities and the Overseas "Pipeline",
WORLDWIDE REFUGEE INFORMATION, available at http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/
pipeline-rrOO9.htm (last visited May 4, 2003).
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or a U.S. embassy.3'3 Refugees of all nationalities are eligible for
admission under P-i; this priority, unlike the others, is not re-
stricted by regional designation. These are cases of compelling
concern, such as torture victims, persons at risk of refoulement (ex-
pulsion or return to territories where they are likely to suffer
persecution) or otherwise in danger in their first asylum country,
and persons in urgent need of medical care. UNHCR may refer
refugees for P-1 processing when its preferred durable solutions-
repatriation and local integration-are unlikely or impossible, usu-
ally when there is due to a protection concern in the asylum
country. UNHCR often bases U.S. referrals on a refugee's family
ties in the United States, but also refers refugees without U.S.-
based family or other contacts. In addition, a consular officer at
the U.S. embassy may also refer refugees to the U.S. resettlement
program, but the norm is to rely on UNHCR referrals.
Priority Two (P-2) is for specific groups within certain nationali-
ties who are of special concern to the United States, as determined
by PRM after consultation with nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and other entities. 7
36. The following come within Priority One: persons facing compelling security con-
cerns in countries of first asylum; persons in need of legal protection because of the danger
of refoulement (return to one's country of origin); those in danger due to threats of armed
attack in areas where they are located; persons who have experienced persecution because
of their political, religious, or human rights activities; women-at-risk; victims of torture or
violence; physically or mentally disabled persons; persons in urgent need of medical atten-
tion not available in the first-asylum country; and persons for whom other durable solutions
are not feasible and whose status in the place of asylum does not present a satisfactory long-
term solution. P-1 referrals must still establish a credible fear of persecution or history of
persecution in the country from which they fled.
37. For FY 2002, Priority Two covered: A) AFRICA: Persons belonging to U.S. State De-
partment-identified refugee groups (within specific nationalities) in consultation with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UNHCR, the INS, and other area experts. Groups
are selected based on their individual circumstances. B) CUBA: In-country (resettled directly
from the country of origin), emphasis given to former political prisoners, members of per-
secuted religious minorities, human rights activists, forced-labor conscripts, persons
deprived of their professional credentials or subjected to other disproportionately harsh or
discriminatory treatment resulting from their perceived or actual political or religious be-
liefs or activities, and dissidents. C) IRAN: Members of Iranian religious minorities. D)
FORMER SOVIET UNION: In-country, Jews, Evangelical Christians, and certain members of the
Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox Churches. Preference among these groups is accorded to
those with close family in the United States. E) VIETNAM: In country, residual cases resulting
from established programs: former reeducation camp detainees who spent more than three
years in detention camps subsequent to April 1975 because of pre-1975 association with the
U.S. government or the former South Vietnamese government; certain former U.S. gov-
ernment employees and other specified individuals or groups of concern; and persons who
returned from first-asylum camps on or after October 1, 1995 who qualify for consideration
under the Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) criteria. In FY
2002, on a case-by-case basis, other individuals who have experienced recent persecution
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Priority Three is family-based, but limited to certain nationali-
ties. 8 Priority Three covers spouses, parents, and unmarried sons
and daughters of people lawfully in the United States as citizens,
resident aliens, refugees, asylees, and parolees. 9 In earlier years,
other, more distant relatives in certain regions were also consid-
ered for resettlement under Priorities Four and Five, but these are
not currently used.4°
After deciding to refer a refugee to the U.S. program, UNHCR
sends the case either to a Joint Voluntary Agency JVA) (a non-
profit agency engaged by the U.S. to process refugees), the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM) (an international
organization with a long history of moving refugees), or to the U.S.
embassy, which collects biographical and other descriptive data
from each person in the refugee's family and prepares the case for
an interview by the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/CIS). P-2 cases and P-
3 family-reunification cases do not require a UNHCR referral. Af-
ter PRM designates a specific group as P-2, refugees in that group
can simply register through the JVA in charge of processing the
cases. Family-reunification cases enter the process at the JVA stage
after a relative in the United States has filed an Affidavit of Rela-
tionship on the refugee's behalf. Once the JVA (or IOM or
embassy) has compiled a sufficient number of cases, a DHS/CIS
official conducts refugee status determination interviews. INS-
recognized refugees are required to take a medical exam and pass
a security screening by the Federal Bureau of Investigation before
they can travel to the United States.
because of post-1975 political, religious, or human rights activities are eligible for in-country
P-1 processing if referred by the U.S. Embassy, members of Congress, or certain nongov-
ernmental organizations and human rights groups. In addition, residual Orderly Departure
Program (ODP) cases registered and previously determined eligible for consideration may
be processed. U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, supra note 35.
38. For FY 2003, these were Burundi and Sudan and Congolese from Congo-
Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. Bush Administration to Reduce Refugee Admissions in FY 2003,
REFUGEE REPORTS, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 3.
39. For FY 2002 Priority Three stated:
Spouses and unmarried children under 21 years of age of U.S. citizens and the par-
ents of U.S. citizens who have attained the age of 21 are required by regulation to be
admitted as immigrants rather than as refugees.
REFUGEE REPORTS, Dec. 1999, at 13.
40. U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, Processing Priorities and the Overseas "Pipeline", supra note
35.
41. Ld. Back in the United States, the Refugee Data Center (RDC) in New York reviews
each case and works with the national voluntary agencies to arrange sponsorship for each
refugee family. The RDC then confirms sponsorship with the JVA overseas, which signals
[VOL. 36:4
The Qualities of Mercy
Upon arrival in the United States, the local resettlement agency
sponsoring the refugee takes over the primary responsibility for
the refugee's first few months in the United States. Resettled refu-
gees are eligible for transitional cash assistance, welfare if they have
children under eighteen, medical assistance, special social services
to support self-sufficiency, and most other generally available social
welfare. One year after admission, refugees may apply for perma-
nent resident status; they are eligible to apply for citizenship after
five years of permanent residence. 43
D. Summary
Clearly, this process involves a great deal of executive branch
discretion in the designation and selection of foreign nationals for
American resettlement. To begin, "the President's power to decide
the size and shape of each year's refugee class is an exceptionally
broad delegation."44 Having specified the number and general lo-
cation of those to be resettled (albeit in consultation with
Congress), the Executive branch, through the State Department,
gets to set the more detailed criteria for their selection, and then
to administer the process by which individuals are approved. Rela-
tively unfettered choice is exercised every step of the way.
The statutory insistence that refugee admissions under the
President's directive "shall be allocated among refugees of special
humanitarian concern to the United States''4' does not impose any
meaningful limit on this Executive branch power. Neither the plain
meaning of "special humanitarian concern" nor its legislative
history is so clear as to impose any real restraint on Executive
46
choice among purposes. There is some indication in the
IOM to complete travel arrangements to the United States. (This phase of the process--
between INS approval and U.S. entry-generally takes three to four months.) U.S. Comm'n
for Refugees, supra note 35.
42. U.S. Comm'n for Refugees, REFUGEE REPORTS, Feb./Mar. 1999, at 1-7; OFFICE OF
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., U.S. RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAM-AN OVERVIEW, available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/
overviewrp.htm (last visited May 4, 2003).
43. Immigration and Nationality Act § 209 (adjustment of status); Immigration and
Nationality Act §§ 209(a) (2), 316(a) (naturalization).
44. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 682. Legomsky sees this as the "clearest counterexam-
pie" to his thesis that Congress generally dominates United States immigration policy. Id.
45. Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(a) (3); 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (a) (3).
46. "Humanitarian concern," while seeming to favor rescue as an aim, is qualified by
"special" which implies coupling concern for the refugees with some other purpose. Under
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legislative history of "special humanitarian concern" that this
phrase was meant to be more attentive to the plight of the refugees
themselves than the language of earlier bills, which used the term
refugees of "special concern."4 7 This change has been invoked to
argue that selection should be based upon the danger to the
refugees themselves. 48 Even this legislative history, however, is not
determinative of the factors that may be considered. The very
House Report emphasizing that the plight of the refugees shall be
"paramount" goes on to mention family, cultural, and historical
ties, as well as past connections with American organizations or
entities as legitimate criteria.4' Moreover, the Report explicitly
eschews any attempt to define the phrase "refugees of special
humanitarian concern."50 Rather, there is a clear delegation of the
issue to the President, to be worked out on a case-by-case basis in
consultation with Congress.
The requirement of refugee status limits the pool of persons eli-
gible for resettlement, but not as much as one might think. The
existence of a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the five
specified grounds is examined much less stringently in overseas
refugee processing than in domestic asylum adjudication. In the
rare instances in which immigration examiners have chosen to
traditional administrative law principles, this ambiguity itself would require judicial defer-
ence to the Executive branch. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
47. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., § 207(a)(1) (1979). This language was described by an
Administration representative as requiring a focus on "whether the refugees have cultural,
historical, or especially family ties to the United States or '[w]hether we have a special re-
sponsibility because of previous U.S. political involvement with the refugee or his country of
origin." Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and International Law of the
House Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979), cited in Anker & Posner, supra
note 21, at 54.
48. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 41.
49. H.R. Rep. 96-608, 96th Cong. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 13. ("The legislation does not-and cannot-further define this phrase. The
Committee believes that any attempt to do so would unnecessarily restrict future public
policy decisions. The Committee recognizes that determining which refugees are of "special
humanitarian concern" to the United States will be a matter to be considered, debated and
decided at the time refugee situations develop.").
51. The thorough review of the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 by Anker
& Posner reaches a similar conclusion. Anker & Posner, supra note 21, at 84.
52. See Martin, supra note 26, at 112 ("As the provisions are actually administered ...
the UN [refugee] definition poses a significantly higher hurdle for asylum applicants. Over-
seas refugee staffs devote very little attention to the question of likely persecution."); see also
NORMAN L. ZUCKER & NAOMI FLINK ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE 153-56 (1987);John A.
Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980,
56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 618, 633 (1981) ("Refugees applying from abroad are ... scruti-
nized less intensively regarding their personal grounds for seeking refuge."); GALLAGHER
ET. AL., supra note 17, at 49 ("In effect, applicants are first asked if they meet the priorities
and, only then, are they asked if they meet the refugee definition.").
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look carefully for a well-founded fear of persecution, they were ei-
ther directed to desist,5' the President's parole power was invoked,
or Congress enacted legislation to modify the refugee standard .
Some kinds of oppression look more like "persecution" than oth-
ers, and at some point it would be hard to label people as
"refugees," but the boundaries are fairly wide.
Moreover, executive branch designation of groups as being of
special humanitarian concern, and of individuals as meeting the
refugee criteria, are not questions that could be reviewed by any
court, 5 so the only constraints would be political. To a large degree
the pool of eligible people is not only deep, but wide as well. The
necessity of choice is notjust theoretical.
The following Parts address and analyze the three major criteria
that might form the basis of the inevitable choices: rescue, foreign
policy, and other more traditional immigration objectives.
III. RESCUE
"Rescue" refers to admitting people to relieve their suffering or
oppression or remove them from some imminent danger. This Part
addresses three elements of rescue, or "humanitarian" refugee se-
lection, as it is often called. First is identification of the kinds of
harm from which we might try to save people. Second is how the
prevalence of that harm bears on the number of people we should
receive. As will become apparent, for any harm we choose to ad-
dress, the number of resettlement places will be just a fraction of
the need. The third issue, therefore, is assessment of relative need
among potential candidates for rescue.
This Part considers the principles that should guide the distribu-
tion of lifesaving resources when the need is great, the resource is
scarce, and no one has an a priori claim. This issue is particularly
acute when the resource is not money-which can, after all, be di-
vided infinitely among those in need. At bottom, refugee
53. National Security Decision Directive on Refugee Policy and Processing Refugees
from Indochina (May 19, 1983), reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. 26840 (Oct. 7, 1987).
54. Fitzpatrick & Pauw, supra note 17, at 763-64.
55. No one would have standing to challenge either decision. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 957 n.22 (1982) (holding that no justifiable case or controversy existed over Execu-
tive branch decision to allow alien to remain in the United States). Further, there is no
statutory provision for judicial review of either the finding of refugee status or the designa-
tion of groups for resettlement.
SUMMER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
resettlement is a question of the distribution of charity, a subject
56
seldom touched upon in legal literature.
A. Types of Suffering or Danger
Three assumptions help to identify the types of harm or danger
that should trigger possible rescue. First, in contrast to usual immi-
grants, who are often accepted because of the benefits they will
bring to the economy, the society or to particular Americans (or
lawful residents), those resettled for humanitarian purposes should
be selected primarily to improve their current life conditions by
relieving suffering or oppression. Second, removal to the U.S.
should in some substantial way alleviate those dangerous condi-
tions. There is little point in admitting people to help them if their
acceptance would not improve their conditions, or if in some other
way it would make their lives worse."
Third, given the magnitude of the world's problems, resettle-
ment should be employed only when aid to the victims in their
own lands is impossible or extremely difficult. Often other means
of ameliorating harsh conditions are potentially available, includ-
ing political and diplomatic pressure on the offending or failing
governments, and direct aid to their inhabitants. In recent years
the Western powers have imposed so-called "safe havens" (interna-
tionally protected areas within the refugees' country of origin) for
refugees in Bosnia (with tragic consequences) and in Northern
Iraq after the First Gulf War (with greater-if still temporary-
success) .59 Additionally, humanitarian intervention-armed force
to protect the population from their persecutors-has been tried
in several places, most notably Iraq, Haiti, and Kosovo. An explicit
56. Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549 (2001)
(stating that government distributions of property have been largely ignored in legal schol-
arship).
57. For a fascinating examination of these issues in the context of an internal Ameri-
can "resettlement," see LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE
CLASS AND COLOR LINES (2000). As part of the settlement of a lawsuit charging racial dis-
crimination in Chicago public housing, about 7000 low-income Black families were
voluntarily relocated to predominantly white, middle-class suburbs. Overall assessment of
the program involved comparing the benefits of improved quality of housing, education,
employment and safety to such costs as racial discrimination, social isolation, and distance
from family, friends, and churches in their original neighborhoods. Id. at 83-192.
58. Stephen R. Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture, inJUsTICE IN IMMIGRATION 94,
103 (Warren F Schwartz ed., 1995).
59. Bill Frelick, Safe Havens; Broken Promises, available at http://www.refugees.org/
world/articles/safehavens_98.htm (1998) (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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reason for such armed interventions has been to forestall refugee
flight and/or permit refugee return. Depending on the circum-
stances, it may be possible to assist victims of war, starvation,
human rights violations or other dangers without relocating them,
sometimes through armed intervention. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the so-called successes of humanitarian intervention were
both expensive and ultimately somewhat mixed, and some inter-
ventions have failed outright.6° Even if intervention is used
occasionally, many of the people who cannot be aided in-place
would still benefit from admission.
Even with these three assumptions, numerous conditions in the
world might justify such sanctuary. The remainder of this section
discusses some of the possibilities.
1. Lack of Political Freedom-Political freedom might be meas-
ured on a variety of scales. In one well-known effort, Freedom
House (a non-profit U.S. based organization) produces an annual
assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in 191
countries. 61 Freedom House describes its study as "the definitive
report on freedom around the globe." Freedom House's survey is
certainly well respected,62 and its broad conclusions provide a rea-
sonable basis for gauging political freedom. In January 2001,
Freedom House found 2.151 billion people (35.51% of the world's
6 billion) living in 47 countries classified "as not free., 63 An addi-
tional 2.465 billion (40.69%) resided in "partly free" nations.64 By
any measure, billions of people are denied political freedom in the
world today.
60. The massacre of thousands of Bosnians given United Nations "safe haven" in Sre-
brenica is the most notorious example. See id. See also DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE
BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR 11
(1997).
61. "Political freedom" involves a number of variables. Freedom House uses political
rights and civil liberties checklists. Freedom House, Survey Methodology, at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/methodology.htm (last visited
May 6, 2003). For an extensive and somewhat wider-ranging effort to measure states' com-
pliance with and effectiveness of human rights treaties, see Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1965 (2002) (using five areas: genocide, tor-
ture, civil liberty, fair and public trials, and political representation of women).
62. Hathaway uses Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom ratings for her civil
liberties variable. Hathaway, supra note 61, at 1975.
63. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1999-2000, available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/essaylb.htm (last visited May 6, 2003).
64. Id. The 2000-01 report on Freedom in the World shows a trend toward greater
freedom. Adrian Karatnycky, The 2000-2001 Freedom House Survey of Freedom, available
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001 /essayl .htm#trend (last visited
May 6, 2003).
SUMMER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
It is safe to assume that everyone but the ruling elites in an un-
free country is affected by the prevailing political conditions there,
if only by the kind of government that results from authoritarian or
totalitarian conditions. In this respect, the absence of political
freedom differs from such human rights violations as torture and
genocide, horrific as they are. Even where the incidence of torture
or genocide is relatively high, not all members of the populace will
be affected. In fact, a very negative human rights rating can result
even where only a small percentage of people are tortured. 65 Al-
though usually not as threatening to life or well being as torture,
denials of political freedoms are much more widespread in their
impact.
Moreover, in contrast to hunger and some diseases, discussed
below, political oppression cannot be remedied easily by outside
intervention. The same is true of other failures of state function,
such as breakdowns in public order and the absence of minimal
subsistence. Allowing immigration may be the only way the U.S.
can meaningfully improve an individual's living conditions.66
2. Hunger-The UN Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) estimates that between 1997 and 1999, there were 815 mil-
lion undernourished people in the world: 777 million in the
65. Thus for example, Hathaway rates torture on a 1 to 5 scale of increasing serious-
ness, with 4 being:
At least one of the following is true: Torture is "common"; there are "several" reports
of torture; there are "many" or "numerous" allegations of torture; torture is "prac-
ticed" (without reference to frequency); there is government apathy or ineffective
prevention of torture; psychological punishment is "frequently" or "often" used;
there are "frequent" beatings or rough handling; mistreatment or beating is "rou-
tine"; there are "some" or "occasional" incidents of beatings to death; or there are
"several" reports of beatings to death.
Hathaway, supra note 61, at 1971.
66. Stephen Perry explains:
It is with respect to ... a fight to permanent residence within a reasonably well-
ordered state, that immigration really comes into its own, since the goods to which
the fight ensures access are nonexportable, public goods. This right will typically be
claimed by persons who are persecuted by their own government or whose basic
rights are unprotected due to the collapse or complete ineffectiveness of political au-
thority in their home country. It may sometimes be possible to honor this right by
helping to create the relevant public goods abroad, either by enabling an existing but
ineffective state to become functional again or by assisting a persecuted group to ex-
ercise its collective right to national self-determination (assuming it possesses this
right). In a great many cases, however, the provision of refuge in the assisting state's
own territory is the only practicable means of honoring the right to permanent resi-
dence within a well-ordered state.
Perry, supra note 58, at 104.
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developing countries, 27 million in transition countries and 11 mil-
lion in the industrialized countries. Relocation to the U.S. as
refugees would most likely eliminate this condition. Aid in the
countries of origin can, in theory, address these problems, though
probably not in as consistent and secure a manner as would reset-
tlement.
3. Disease-The incidence of certain diseases varies widely from
country to country, as does life expectancy in general. Cures, or at
least the means of alleviation of symptoms, are available in the
United States for many diseases that go largely untreated elsewhere
because of some combination of poverty and the dearth of health
facilities. In addition, societal reaction to certain diseases can be
harsher in foreign lands than it is in the US. The case of
HIV/AIDS provides an illustrative example, as summarized by the
World Health Organization in 2001:
HIV is spreading very rapidly in many parts of the world. At
the end of 2000, a total of 36.1 million people were living with
HIV/AIDS and 21.8 million had already died (UNAIDS
2000). Of the 5.3 million new infections in 2000, 1 in 10 oc-
curred in children and almost half among women. In 16
countries of sub-Saharan Africa more than 10% of the popu-
lation of reproductive age is now infected with HIV. The
HIV/AIDS epidemics has lowered economic growth and is
reducing life expectancy by up to 50% in the hardest hit
countries. In many countries HIV/AIDS is now considered a
threat to national security.
The mental health consequences of this epidemic are sub-
stantial. A proportion of individuals suffer psychological
consequences (disorders as well as problems) as a result of
their infection. The effects of intense stigma and discrimina-
tion against people with HIV/AIDS also play a major role in
psychological stress. Disorders range from anxiety or depres-
sive disorders to adjustment disorder. Cognitive deficits are
also detected if looked for specifically. In addition, family
members also suffer the consequences of stigma ...
67. UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, STATE OF FOOD INSE-
CURITY IN THE WORLD 2001. The FAO defines "undernourishment" to mean "food intake
that is continuously insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements." Id.
68. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 44 (2001), available at http://
www.who.int/whr/2001/main/en/pdf/chapter2.en.pdf. At the end of 2001, 40 million
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The extent of other health threats, how they vary from country
to country, and whether the sufferers could be helped by reloca-
tion to the U.S. or another developed country could also be
examined. It is not necessary to do so in detail, however, to estab-
lish that resettlement would vastly improve the life chances and
conditions for many of the world's ill in ways that are not going to
happen in their own lands.69 Indeed, some diseases, such as para-
sitic infection, can be fought simply by geographic relocation.
4. Armed Conflict-Armed conflict can pose enormous dangers
for civilians, but it is very hard to get an accurate estimate of the
extent and degree of the threat. Not all civilians face equal expo-
sure, and not everyone in a country at war faces danger or
hardship. Furthermore, most military situations are so fluid that
conditions are constantly changing. A statistical report is nothing
more than a snapshot, and a blurry one at that.
A very rough (and probably high) estimate of the extent of
armed conflict and its dangers can be obtained by taking all coun-
tries currently at war of some kind. According to the Center for
Defense Information, in 2001 there were forty conflicts involving
thirty countries.7  The population of these countries was
3,332,955,000 (3.3 billion). Not all of these people faced immedi-
ate peril, but if even a hundredth did at some time or another, the
total is in the tens of millions. While peacemaking efforts could
end the threats caused by armed conflict, and assistance of various
kinds in the country of origin can certainly give added safety even
during the fighting, many people will remain at risk unless relo-
people were living with HIV/AIDS. UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 8
(2002), available at http://www.unaids.org/barcelona/presskit/report.html. Given the mag-
nitude of the AIDS/HIV epidemic, and at least the theoretical possibility of treating its
victims in their countries of origin, the idea of resettling them does not seem to be part of
the discussion of the international response. See, e.g., Symposium, The Global AIDS Crisis:
Human Rights, International Pharmaceutical Markets and Intellectual Property, 17 CONN. J. OF
INT'L. L. 149 (2002). At present HIV-infected aliens would need a waiver of their general
ineligibility for admission under U.S. law. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(i). See Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(c)(3), (waiver of inadmissi-
bility ground for humanitarian purposes).
69. For one example, conducted during the Kosovo refugee crisis, see Istvan Szilard et
al., International Organization for Migration: Experience on the Need for Medical Evacuation of Refu-
gees during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, 43 CROATIAN MED. J. 195 (2002), available at
http://www.cmj.hr (reporting the evacuation of over 1000 medical cases to 25 host coun-
tries throughout the world, and describing criteria for priority evacuation, including
seriousness of condition, likelihood of improvement, and unavailability of treatment in
present location).
70. Center for Defense Information, 2001-02 Military Almanac 43-46 (2002), available
at http://www.cdi.org/products/almanac0102.pdf.
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cated. In fact, armed conflict is a primary cause of forced migra-
tion, particularly internal displacement.
7
1
5. Refugees-Refugees, persons who are forced to leave their
normal places of residence, present a relatively restrictive measure
of need but the numbers are still in the millions. At the end of
2001, the U.S. Committee for Refugees reported 14,921,000 asy-
lum-seekers and refugees outside their countries of origin.72 This
organization also identified at least 22 million "internally displaced
persons" (IDP's)-people who have left their homes for safer loca-
tions within their own countries.73 Adding this figure to that for
"refugees" brings a total of over 36 million people. Using a differ-
ent measure that included some IDP's and returned refugees,
UNHCR tallied 19,783,100 refugees and "people of concern" to
the agency at the end of 2001.7" The accuracy of refugee statistics is
always debatable, at least at the margins, but for the purposes of
this Article, they are enough to indicate the dimensions of the
problem. 6
6. Summary-However conceived, the global need for shelter
from hardship-social suffering-is enormous. Even limiting reset-
tlement's use with the assumptions above,77 relocation is the only
realistic solution to the present hardship of tens of millions of
people. It is also clear that not more than a small fraction of those
facing intolerable living conditions are going to be accommodated,
at least not in developed countries such as the U.S., Canada, West-
ern Europe, or Australia.
71. ARISITIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFU-
GEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 269 (1989).
72. U.S. COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 3.
73. Id. at 6.
74. UNHCR, Estimated Number of Persons of Concern Who Fall Under the Mandate
of UNHCR, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=statistics (last
visited March 29, 2003).
75. U.S. COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 1 ("Statistics on refugees and other
uprooted people are often inexact and controversial.").
76. Strictly speaking, not all of those displaced within or from their own countries
meet the literal U.S. definition of a refugee, so the number eligible under the current U.S.
resettlement program would presumably be lower than the above figures. Given past U.S.
practice of refugee screening, this is not likely to be a large reduction. Furthermore, since
American resettlement is potentially available to those in their own countries with a fear of
persecution whether they have relocated or not, the internal displacement figures actually
underestimate the number of potential "refugees." In addition to the numbers reflected in
the statistics above, millions more with a well-founded fear of persecution have not left their
places of residence.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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One way to limit the resettlement pool is to set some threshold
criteria. The U.S. limits resettlement opportunities to "refugees,"
people who have suffered past persecution on account of race, re-
ligion, nationality, political opinion, or social group membership
or who have a well-founded fear of such persecution in the future.
The standard is not always rigorously applied,7 s but it does impose
some outer boundaries. Presumably, persons suffering, for exam-
ple, from a disease curable only in the U.S. would not qualify no
matter how severe their need. For this reason, the refugee defini-
tion has been criticized as treating morally equivalent threats
differently, on the ground that persecution is not the only cause of
serious threats to well being.79 The point is valid, but it must be re-
membered that the broader the initial criteria, the more important
become the other bases for selection, unless, of course, the num-
ber of resettlement slots increases correspondingly.
B. Quantity
The number of refugees accepted each year is set by a political
process.s This number bears very little relation to existing need,
and, indeed, does not pretend to. In theory, however, the issue of
how many persons in need of sanctuary should be taken by the
United States--or any country-raises profound moral questions.
Several writers have considered the relationship between those
in need, on the one hand, and those with the means to fill those
needs, on the other. Philosopher Peter Singer's answer, given in
the context of famine relief, is the most radical: "We ought to give
until we reach the level of marginal utility-that is, the level at
which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself
or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.". Though Singer
was speaking in monetary terms in describing his theory of mar-
ginal utility, the principle can be applied to refugee admissions as
well. In some ways the argument for charity is even stronger in this
context. A dollar donated to the hungry is a dollar less for the
78. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
79. See, e.g., Andrew E. Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274, 276-77 (1985); As-
tri Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY 157, 159-60 (Mary M. Kritz ed., 1983).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
81. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
21, 33 (Laslett and Fishkin eds., 1992). For a discussion and critique of this argument, see
JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION 70-79 (1982).
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donor. In that sense a financial gift is a zero sum process; more for
the recipient is less for the donor, at least in absolute terms
(though not, as Singer points out, in relative value). But refugee
admissions are not a zero-sum process: the benefit to the refugee
does not cause a corresponding harm to the society that welcomes
him or her.82 In fact, there may be no harm at all, at least until the
numbers reach some kind of tipping point.
3
When directly confronting the ethics of overseas refugee
acceptance, Singer does not apply his pure form of marginal utility,
but instead proposes a balancing of refugees' interests against
those of the receiving country's inhabitants. Only when the harm
to the receiving country outweighs, or interferes with, the benefits
to the arriving refugees does the balance of interests shift toward
non-acceptance. Therefore, "affluent nations should be taking far,
far more refugees than they are taking today," and "potential
refugee settlement countries should, on the basis of the principle
of equal consideration of interests, gradually increase their refugee
intakes. 8 4 The philosopher and political theorist Michael Walzer
has a less expansive view of such obligations.s5 When the number of
refugees is large, he writes, the answer is not necessarily to increase
acceptance, but to choose among the victims on the basis of ethnic,
religious, or ideological affinity.1
6
Matthew Gibney makes the important point that refugee
acceptance (including both resettlement and asylum) represents a
relatively small percentage of total immigration in developed
82. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE 49 (1983) ("[A]dmitting refugees doesn't
necessarily decrease the amount of liberty the [country's citizens] enjoy within that space.").
It does not reduce other societal goods, either, at least not on a one-to-one basis. Thus, while
refugees may take jobs, for example, their presence also stimulates the economy, creating
additional employment. Cf, GEORGE BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR- IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 62-67 (1999).
83. Peter Singer & Renata Singer, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS?
CLOSED SOCIETIES? 111, 127 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988). Cf., MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIP-
PING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). On the other hand,
it can be contended that even small numbers can have some effect in depressing wages lev-
els in the domestic economy.
84. Singer & Singer, supra note 83, at 128.
85. WALTER, supra note 82, at 48-51.
86. Id. at 49-50. Walzer does see the possibility of asylum as a safety valve for large
numbers of overseas refugees, but seems to assume it would be sought by a relatively small
number of persons. Id. at 51. For a critique of Walzer's position, see Singer & Singer, supra
note 83, at 117-21;John A. Scanlan & O.T. Kent, The Force of MoralArgumentsforaJustlmmi-
gration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary American Example, in OPEN BORDERS?
CLOSED SOCIETIES? 61, 85-90 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
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countries."' For example, in fiscal year 2001, only 9% of total US
permanent admissions went to refugees and asylees. By contrast,
65% went to the various forms of family reunion. Gibney applies a
principle of humanitarianism: the duty to assist those in great
distress when the cost of doing so is low. Countries that would be
unwilling to increase the number of immigrants, he concludes,
ought to at least change the composition of their immigrant pool,
favoring refugees over relatives who are not members of their
citizen's immediate families and over employment-based migrants.
Wherever one would draw the line on reordering current
immigrant priorities, it is hard to disagree that increasing refugee
admissions at the expense of some economic and family entrants is
a relatively painless way of expanding refugee relief.""
Each additional resettlement slot is clearly valuable in itself, in
that more people would share in the material comforts, civil rights,
and political security of the receiving country.9° While recognizing
that the greater the resettlement resource, the less acute the
choices, for two reasons this Article concerns mainly the need to
allocate those slots that do exist, rather than addressing directly the
number that should be devoted to resettlement. One is that, in the
absence of some particularly compelling crisis, refugee admission
numbers appear highly unlikely to increase drastically. More im-
portantly, there is no possibility whatsoever of the total number of
admissions ever approaching need. Even Peter Singer's argument,
at its most extreme, would not reach the point of meeting all refu-
gees' needs for sanctuary.
87. Matthew J. Gibney, Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees, 93 AM.
POL. Sci. REV., No. 1, 169, 180 (Mar. 1999). Canadian immigration is divided into family,
economic, and humanitarian streams, with a planned number of admissions designated for
each group. From 1997-99, the humanitarian stream comprised from 11% to 13% of total
immigration. Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christopher Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at Im-
migration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 Go. IMMIGR. L.J. 99,109 (2001).
88. Employment-based categories took up 9% and diversity immigration 4%. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 2001 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Table 5 (2003).
89. On the other hand, some contend that "if refugee admissions are placed in com-
petition with those of family members and others eligible for immigrant status, the refugee
program would lose its special humanitarian mandate." GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 17, at
35. Interestingly it was an opponent of increased refugee admission numbers, Senator Wal-
ter Huddleston, who proposed trading off immigration slots against refugee places under an
overall cap. The rationale for this proposal seems to have been that, if forced to choose, the
U.S. would not sacrifice immigration aims for humanitarian reasons. Congress defeated the
proposal. Id. at 34-35.
90. For such reasons, Bill Frelick, then Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees,
laments the failure to use, on average, 11% of the annual refugee admission target numbers
over the last ten years-a cumulative total of almost 107,000 places. Frelick, supra note 4, at
37.
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C. Measuring Relative Need
Even if the eligible population were limited to "refugees," peo-
ple with a "well-founded fear of persecution" leading to death,
serious physical harm, or lengthy imprisonment, judgments about
relative need would still be necessary. Some refugees face more
serious threats than others, and that difference in risk can, in the-
ory at least, be a valid basis for refugee selection. At present,
seriously endangered refugees are handled under Priority One,9'
which receives only about 20% of refugee places.92
How might the relative need for resettlement be measured? The
most important factors are the degree and probability of harm.93
The probabilities of harm occurring if the person is not resettled
vary widely, and not all harms are equal; death, rape, or torture are
far more serious than a brief incarceration or the loss of a job. A
lower probability of a more serious harm can thus produce a
greater overall risk than a higher chance of less dire consequences.
A person facing a 10% threat of death, most would agree, is more
at risk than one facing a 50% chance of, say, dismissal from work.
This relationship can be expressed as a formula: p x H, where p
represents probability and H harm. Obviously, people may disagree
about the ranking or degree of different harms, but once assigned
a value in theory relative risk may be evaluated by multiplying the
degree of harm by its probability.
94
For people still in the country of persecution, this assessment is
very much like that made by adjudicators in potential asylum coun-
tries. Some applicants, at least, will have a measurable probability
of harm if they remain in their homelands, and resettlement can
eliminate that hazard. If resettlement is to be a serious tool to res-
cue people from persecution, however, we should make more
efforts to do so. This means more in-country processing where that
is possible and more outreach to individuals at risk before they flee
their homelands.95
91. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
92. Refugee Data Center, FISCAL YEAR ARRIVALS BY PRIORITY CODE 1996-2000, at 16-
18 (on file with author).
93. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 699.
94. For a different formula containing these two factors, see Jean-Yves Carlier, The Ge-
neva Refugee Definition and the "Theory of the Three Scales," in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES
37 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
95. See text accompanying infra notes 204-08.
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At present, most resettled refugees come from countries of first
asylum. They are already outside the place where they are threat-
ened-their countries of origin-and living in another country,
usually a neighboring one. They may be surviving in very harsh
conditions, but are at least safe from the original threat."6 How
then to determine who among them is the most seriously endan-
gered? People who are not completely safe from the original
persecution should be the first priority, because, for example, their
enemies might manage to reach them in exile or they may face a
realistic threat of return to their country of origin. Evaluating these
risks, including both the potential harm and its probability, is an
uncertain enterprise even in the best of circumstances. As with asy-
lum adjudication, the basic facts of potential persecution are
difficult to determine in a refugee camp setting. Applicants have
an interest in the outcome, and corroborating witnesses or docu-
ments are difficult to locate.97 The same is true for predictive
judgments about danger if the individual returns to her home-
land . The Americans located in the country of asylum who
conduct these interviews inevitably lack all the relevant informa-
tion. The cross-cultural aspects of the interviews and the need for
translators compound the problem. These difficulties mean that
separating the seriously endangered from others is a time-
consuming and inexact task,99 but it can be done in some rough
way.
The second category of people at risk is those who are exposed
to exceptional danger in their place of refuge. This danger can
include starkly inadequate food or medical care, exposure to
crimes such as rape or robbery, or forced military recruitment. 00
Women without a male protector and unaccompanied children are
96. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 47 ("It is a rare circumstance for people who
have already left their country of origin to be in immediate danger of loss of life....").
97. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 1280-82 (1990); see also CUcile Rousseau et al., The Complexity of
Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-Making Process of the Cana-
dian Immigration and Refugee Board, 15J. REFUGEE STUD. 43 (2002) ("Deciding upon refugee
claims ... is the single most complex adjudication function in contemporary Western socie-
ties.").
98. Martin, supra note 97, at 1285 ("This is not a scientific prediction based on regular
laws or formulas; it is an assessment that should be based, as much as possible, on conscien-
tious attention to country condition information and individual facts.").
99. Frelick, supra note 4, at 36 ("Identifying and processing the higher priorities is la-
bor-intensive, often entailing multiple interviews and much paperwork.").
100. Id. at 50. For one of the many illustrative accounts, see Margaret Emery, Sierra
Leonean Refugee Women and the Challenge of Reintegration, REFUGEE REPORTS Aug. 2002, at 10,
11-12.
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often particularly at risk.'I ' Ironically, it may be easier to make an
accurate estimate of these threats than those in the country of ori-
gin, because they are taking place currently, not in the past, in
places where international aid workers are often present.
A third, related, category of need encompasses so-called long-
staying refugees-those who spend years, if not decades, in refugee
camps without opportunity for repatriation or local settlement."°2
The most notable example is the Palestinians (who are generally
treated as an exception to most refugee law) , ° but numerous
other cases have arisen in recent years. 10 4 Defining long-term refu-
gees is often much easier than identifying threatened individuals
because the duration of stay, a retrospective fact, is not hard to as-
certain. Estimating the likelihood of some alternative solution-
repatriation or local settlement-requires predicting political de-
velopments, but this is probably more certain than estimating
degrees of individual risk. The real issue is how to weigh the claims
of long-stayers against those more at risk of serious physical harm
inside or outside of their present place of asylum. How can a prob-
ability (or well-founded fear) of imprisonment or death, for
example, be balanced against the virtual certainty of a miserable
existence in an impoverished refugee camp?
Moreover, because many more long-term refugees exist than the
U.S. could ever accommodate even if they were given all refugee
admission slots, which ones should be resettled? Should there be a
"waiting list" with the oldest cases rising to the top? This would
101. SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN 16-21 (1992); UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN 1 3 (1991) ("In addition to these basic needs shared
with all refugees, refugee women and girls have special protection needs that reflect their
gender: they need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and physical abuse
and exploitation, and protection against sexual discrimination in the delivery of goods and
services.").
102. See GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 200-03 (1993).
103. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1 (D), 19 U.S.T.
6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 156 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (exempting persons
then receiving assistance from any United Nations organ or agency from Refugee Conven-
tion coverage); [Ex TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 49-67 (1998).
104. Frelick, supra note 4, at 35-37. "Millions of refugees worldwide have been rele-
gated to a limbo existence, warehoused in camps or settlements with no prospects for
voluntary repatriation or local integration. Children born and raised within the confines of
camps often never see normal life outside the fences. These populations often become de-
pendent and despondent, with predictably negative social consequences." Id. at 35. "For
persecuted [refugees in camps], the alternative to resettlement is to languish for many years
in what amounts to a prison, isolated from normal social intercourse and economic activity
and without the amenities of family life." Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest
Proposa4 22 YALEJ. INTL. L. 243, 269 (1997).
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mean that the people who are finally chosen would not get relief
until after years of wretched exile. Waiting list seniority is common
for limited immigration preferences, 0 5' but the hardships of accu-
mulating sufficient refugee "seniority" are considerably greater
than peacefully awaiting an immigrant visa in one's country of ori-
gin. On the other hand, with a method other than seniority, how
can "prospective" long-term refugee populations be identified early
in their tenure? Alternatively, should selection from among long-
term refugees be on the basis of "U.S. ties," as Bill Frelick recently
recommended, or by lot, his second priority?'0 6 One approach
would be to resettle long-term refugee groups that are somewhat
self-contained, so that an entire ethnic group or at least an entire
camp population could be given a durable solution without leaving
a few behind."'
How should the plight of persons facing some present danger or
hardship be weighed against the claim of those who have suffered
past persecution but are not currently at risk? The U.S. refugee
definition includes both groups, s08 and for many years the U.S. gave
its largest number of refugee visa allocations to refugees who had
experienced past persecution rather than those currently in dan-
ger.1 °9 Some observers would put these refugees at the bottom of
the hierarchy of need."0 While this is a reasonable position, some
people may be so badly traumatized by their experience of perse-
cution that their need for resettlement equals or exceeds some of
the other groups considered here, such as long-staying refugees."'
IV. FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES
Most observers of refugee resettlement since World War II con-
clude, often critically, that the majority of admissions have been
distributed on "foreign policy" grounds, ' 12 in contrast to more
105. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN, available at
http://travel.state.gov/visa_bulletin.html (last visited May 4, 2003) (reporting priority dates
for family-based immigrant visas).
106. Id. at 36.
107. See text accompanying infra notes 210-13.
108. See text accompanying supra note 31.
109. Susan Raufer, In-Country Processing of Refugees, 9 GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 233, 255 (1995)
(citing SovietJews and Evangelical Christians as examples).
110. Id.
111. Cf ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 52, at 270 (proposing a refugee admission prior-
ity based on both degree of past persecution and current risk).
112. Gil Loescher and John Scanlan summarize their comprehensive review:
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need-based criteria. For much of that period "foreign policy" was
virtually synonymous with anti-Communism. With the waning of
Communism as both a presence and a threat, that linkage is obvi-
ously obsolete, but, as events since September 11 illustrate, foreign
policy is no less an important national concern today.
Refugee resettlement can potentially serve a variety of foreign
policy goals and complaints of a foreign policy bias in refugee ad-
missions do not always acknowledge the differences. The following
sections separate the various strands and discuss their implications
for refugee resettlement as well as their relation to other criteria.
A. Refugees We Have "Created"
Favoring people whose persecution or other danger the U.S. has
helped to cause has strong appeal. This connection, as with other
relationships, may form the basis for rights and duties that would
otherwise not exist. 13 Michael Walzer, who rejects a more universal
moral obligation to persecuted persons in general," 4 forcefully
states this position:
Humanitarians clearly played a role in bringing thousands of refugees to the United
States, restrictionists a role in keeping thousands of others out. But over the last four
decades, it has become increasingly clear that foreign policy choices ordinarily have
played the key role in determining which refugees will be permitted to enter the
United States. Thus the Hungarians in 1956, the Cubans who entered between 1960
and 1966, and the Indochinese transported from Saigon in 1975 were the beneficiar-
ies of little lobbying and no legislation, yet were admitted into the United States by
the tens of thousands by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford administra-
tions. In each instance, their entry was favored by the Department of State and
regarded as an obligation or an opportunity created by the cold war. Conversely, over
the last two decades, the United States has closed its borders to virtually every refugee
fleeing persecution at the hands of authoritarian regimes.
LOESCHER & SCANtAN, supra note 18, at xvii; see also PETER H. KOE-iN, REFUGEES FROM
REVOLUTION: U.S. POLICY AND THIRD-WORLD MIGRATION 207-13 (1991); Tang Thanh Trai
Le, The Legal Status of the Refugee in the United States, 42 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 577, 605 (Supp.
1994) (refugee admissions are a "creature of U.S. foreign policy"); Legomsky, supra note 17,
at 698 ("[Tlhe central thrust of United States refugee policy has always been the pursuit of
national self-interest-in particular, foreign policy goals, and more particularly the battle
against Communism."); Tyson, supra note 17, at 921 ("In practice, political considerations
take priority over humanitarian concerns.").
113. Andrew E. Shacknove, American Duties to Refugees: Their Scope and Limits, in OPEN
BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? 131, 141 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
114. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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Toward some refugees, we may well have obligations of the
same sort that we have toward fellow nationals. This is obvi-
ously the case with regard to any group of people whom we
have helped turn into refugees. The injury we had done them
makes for an affinity between us: thus Vietnamese refugees
had, in a moral sense, been effectively Americanized even be-
fore they arrived on these shores.'
I
Prior connection to their battles with Communist opponents
certainly were important to our acceptance of well over 1 million
Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao refugees from the 1970's to the
1990's. But what does it mean to "help turn" people into refugees,
or to "do injury" to them? As Andrew Shacknove aptly states, "[i] n
some instances, . . . the causal relationship between state policy and
the existence of refugees is clear. In other instances the causal link
is more ambiguous and the task of assessing responsibility more
problematic."" 6
Perhaps the strongest case for moral responsibility is where the
U.S. has promoted an uprising or other resistance in another
country and then fails to follow through with military support. The
Hungarian revolution of 1956, for example, was instigated, in part,
by CIA-trained agents. Even after the Soviet army restored control,
Radio Free Europe repeatedly broadcast, "America will not fail
you" to its Hungarian listeners. ' 7 In this atmosphere, a feeling of
responsibility-if not guilt-helped build support for large-scale
resettlement of the "victims of false expectations about U.S. pol-
icy... 8 Sadly, a very similar sequence of events took place at the end
of the Persian Gulf War, initiated by a statement by then-President
Bush which Shi'a in the South and Kurds in the north of Iraq in-
terpreted as a signal to revolt against Saddam Hussein."" Kosovo
115. WALZER, supra note 82, at 49.
116. Shacknove, supra note 113, at 131, 141.
117. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 53.
118. Id. at 53-54 ("Eisenhower quickly came under pressure from his supporters to pro-
vide refugee relief in lieu of the military aid that had been withheld."). Interestingly, only a
fraction of those admitted had actually taken part in the Hungarian uprising. Most others
had seized an opportunity to escape a closed, controlled society. Id. at 50-51.
119. During a February 15, 1991 speech, President Bush stated, "There's another way
for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take mat-
ters into their own hands, and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside." RAMSEY
CLARK, THE FIRE THIS TIME: U.S. WAR CRIMES IN THE GULF 55 (1992). In addition to Presi-
dent Bush's requests, the U.S. government issued statements on the radio station Voice of
Free Iraq (VOFI). Id. VOFI was CIA funded and operated with the assistance of Saudi intel-
ligence. Id. at 56. These statements, translated into Kurdish and Arabic, directly urged the
Kurd people to rebel. Id. at 55. "Rise! This is your moment! This time, the allies will not let
you down!" Id. at 56. "We are with you in every heartbeat, in all your feelings, and in every
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presents a different but almost equally compelling case in which a
NATO ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic seems to have provoked
Serbia's ethnic cleansing of the province, forcing hundreds of
thousands to leave.1
2 0
Beyond these situations, causal connections become muddled,
and moral responsibility less clear, as exemplified by the U.S. ex-
perience in Indochina. To summarize broadly the complex events
of many years, the U.S. gradually increased its involvement in Viet-
nam, Laos, and Cambodia from providing logistical and political
assistance, to advisers, to, in the case of Vietnam, massive numbers
of fighting forces. The U.S. did so at the request of the national
governments, but predominantly for its own anti-Communist rea-
sons. Once the U.S. was heavily involved, the fighting with
Communist rebels and North Vietnam became more intense.
Thousands of Indochinese became "connected" to the U.S. effort
as allies, employees, workers with American companies, or friends
move you make .... We stand by you in whatever you carry out and whatever step you take."
Id. In order to incite uprisings throughout Iraq, VOFI promoted the liberation of Baghdad
by making a general call out to the "brother Iraqis". "The Iraqi's have never felt such enthu-
siasm,joy, and desire to take part in the revolution or be martyrs." Id.
While VOFI encouraged uprisings and promised military assistance, various media re-
ported that the "dominant assessment among U.S. intelligence officials suggested that
neither the Iranian Shi'is in the south nor the Kurds in the north" had any real chance of
sustaining a successful rebellion. YITZHAK NAKASH, THE SHI'IS OF IRAq 275 (1994). True to
these reports, it took Hussein and his loyalists only a few weeks to crush both insurrections
and to regain control. Id. On March 26, 1991 the U.S. decided to forego taking any action to
intervene or assist the rebels. Id. at 276. Some analysts have surmised that the U.S.'s decision
to withhold support was made out of fear for the potential fragmentation of Iraq via "a gen-
eral civil war or the intervention of regional powers, especially Iran." CHARLES TRIPP, A
HISTORY OF IRAQ 258 (2000). Some have suggested that the post-war refugee crisis was due
to the United States government's perceived deceit and lack of support. CLARK, supra, at 56.
After the failed Shi'ite rebellions in Nasiriya and Basra, over 500,000 Iraqi citizens became
refugees. MARK PERRY, ECLIPSE: THE LAST DAYS OF THE CIA 398 (1992). The U.S. eventually
resettled 29,496 of them. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE REPORTS, Dec. 2000, at
10-11.
120. Many erroneously expected Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milosevic to sign the
Rambouillet Peace Agreement after NATO's ultimatum was issued and its aerial campaign
commenced. Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective From Inside, in Kosovo AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE AC-
TION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 36 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds.,
2000). Instead, what resulted was what has been called has been called the "greatest ethnic
cleansing that Europe has seen since the end of the Second World War." Id. Although the
figures vary from source to source, it is estimated that nearly "one million Albanians were
forced from their homes, and many others were massacred, raped, and tortured." Id.
NATO's decision to use air attacks on Yugoslavia during the Kosovo Crisis has been hotly
debated. Those opposed to the air strikes argue that the strikes vastly increased the ethnic
cleansing they were supposed to prevent. Those in favor of the strikes counter that "even if
this was true at the beginning of the campaign, afterwards all refugees were able to go back
to Kosovo." Id. at 43 n.10.
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or spouses. When Communist forces claimed victory in 1975, these
people often faced special dangers of death, imprisonment, "re-
education," or other forms of persecution or discrimination.
The immediate cause of the threats against these people was
their involvement with the losing government and its American
allies, of course, but did the U.S. "create" these threats? The U.S.
had been invited in to help, and many of the people who joined
the national armies or governments did so of their own volition.
Many had already taken sides before the U.S. participation, and
others would have even if there had never been an American pres-
ence. Yet for many people association with a hated foreign enemy
in a brutal civil war could certainly have exacerbated the conse-
quences of landing on the losing side.
Having come to help but having failed, the U.S., in effect, is of-
ten expected to be the guarantor of the people it sought to aid.
Can anyone doubt that members of the Northern Alliance and
their families would have been resettled if the joint fall 2001 offen-
sive against the Taliban had resulted in defeat? "Victory or
resettlement" often seems to be an implicit American promise.
While there may be practical reasons to give this kind of guarantee,
in that it certainly encourages alliance with U.S. interests,1 2' not
every "ally" necessarily becomes a refugee "America has created" or
whose "injury America has caused" if that common effort does not
succeed. Rather, the moral claim very much varies with the circum-
stances.
B. Rewarding Cooperation with U.S.
Over the years, the U.S. often has accepted refugees who have
worked for or with American civil or military authorities, voluntary
agencies, or companies. In some cases these refugees may have a
strong moral claim to assistance because of American responsibility
for the very existence of the threatened harm; in others past asso-
ciation with the U.S. may currently put them in greater danger.
Another reason for resettlement, it could be argued, is that past
connection also increases their likelihood of successful integration
in the U.S. after arrival.
From the point of view of inducing people to work with Ameri-
can agencies, the possibility of resettlement if the American effort
meets with failure operates like life insurance or any other em-
121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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ployment benefit by making the job more attractive. While it is true
that almost nobody is promised admission to the U.S. before the
danger of retaliation materializes, some may be aware of the gen-
eral possibility of resettlement as one more attractive feature of
working for a U.S. entity. From the perspective of American agen-
cies, factoring the potential costs of large-scale refugee acceptance
following a failed U.S. engagement or intervention could actually
deter U.S. involvement in the first place. Interestingly, this consid-
eration hardly ever seems to be taken into account, perhaps
because the downside risk of U.S. engagement is generally under-
played.
C. Embarrassing a Disfavored Nation.
A third foreign policy justification for refugee acceptance is to
embarrass a disfavored nation or regime, whose citizens are, so to
speak, voting with their feet by leaving. Labeling the emigrants as
refugees-people with a fear of persecution-further tars the
source country. 2' Cold War refugee acceptance from Communist
countries constituted the high-water mark of this use of refugee
admissions.2 3 In the period in which Western and Eastern political
and economic systems competed for adherents in the rest of the
world, refugee acceptance was a propaganda tool. As Ronald
Reagan used to say, "you don't see people risking their lives to cross
the Berlin Wall from west to east.',
2 4
This foreign policy tool is not likely to have much of a future.2 5
It flourished during a particular historical period in which there
was a perceived clash of ideologies and a desire to "win the hearts
and minds" of the world's peoples. There is no comparable battle
122. SeeJames C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARV. INTL. L.J. 129, 145-51 (1990) (arguing that both Western countries and Soviet Union
saw development of refugee concept as an attempt to bolster condemnation of Soviet bloc).
123. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 47-48, 65, 75-76.
124. President Ronald Reagan, Fiftieth Anniversary Banquet of the International Res-
cue Committee (Nov. 15, 1983).
125. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, on the other hand, believes this to
be a worthwhile purpose, stating, "[s]elective resettlement of political dissidents and other
victims of serious human rights violations can be an important component of U.S. foreign
policy, highlighting the human rights abuses practices by other countries and, thereby, sup-
porting efforts to encourage other countries to respect fundamental human rights and
democratic principles." U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 26, at 39.
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today, despite talk of a clash of civilizations. 2 6 Moreover, with the
many motives that impel people to flee, the message emigration
supposedly sends about the country of origin can be highly am-
biguous. In a world where information is so much more readily
available than during the Cold War, refugee acceptance seems an
indirect and inefficient means of conveying negative images. Fi-
nally, whatever publicity value might come from encouraging or
highlighting emigration from a particular country seems a small
payoff compared to other possible uses of refugee admissions. In
retrospect, this was probably true even for Cold War era resettle-
ment.
D. Undermining a Disfavored Nation
While embarrassing a source country may undermine its appeal
to the rest of the world, refugee acceptance can inflict other, more
direct, kinds of damage on the country itself. One is to create a
"brain drain" by luring away talented individuals who are needed
for economic, military, or other essential functions in the country
of origin. If persecution targets the educated classes, or if resis-
tance is concentrated among them, they are likely to be among
potential refugees anyway. 12 7 The question then becomes whether
to favor this group in order to sap their homeland's human capital.
As a conscious policy it requires that a relatively small educated
population receive a relatively large number of admissions for
there to be an appreciable impact, as was the case with Cuba in the
1960'S.128 For that reason this also seems a very low-priority use of
refugee resettlement.' 2
126. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE RE-
MAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). Michael Mandelbaum argues that while terrorism poses a
security threat, it does not embody any ideological alternative to western values of peace,
democracy, and free markets. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE
WORLD: PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (2002).
127. LOESCHER, supra note 102, at 18-19 ("Refugee movements are often made to hap-
pen by governments in order to reduce or eliminate selected social classes and ethnic
groups within their own borders."). See also ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEM-
PORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 161-62 (1987).
128. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 76 (discussing Fidel Castro's com-
plaints about the loss of skilled workers to the U.S.). On the other hand, their departure
reduced the number of dissidents, allowed their property to be redistributed, and facilitated
the socialization of the Cuban economy. Id.
129. For a thoughtful discussion of the sometimes conflicting effects of such population
relocations, see Robert G. Darst, Plying the Humanitarian Human Trade: The Politics of Facilita-
tive Relocation, 14J. REFUGEE STUD. 213, 243-44 (2001).
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A second form of de-stabilization through refugee acceptance
can come by building opposition to the country of origin among
the resettled refugees. Refugee populations adjacent to their coun-
tries of origin have long been intertwined with armed resistance
movements. 3 0 Though less common, resettled refugees can also
form the core of attempts to liberate their homelands; witness the
Free French, Poles, and others in England during World War II.
For American resettlement, again, Cuba is an example, with the ill-
fated Bay of Pigs invasion and other attempts by Cuban exiles (with
U.S. government help) to overturn the Castro government.""'
Encouraging resistance to an oppressive regime is probably one
of the more justifiable foreign policy uses of refugee resettlement
(putting aside for the moment the international law issues raised
by providing a base for destabilization of another state). Its virtue
lies in the fact that it not only gives sanctuary to the victims of per-
secution, but also involves affirmative steps to end those threats.'32
Resistance activities need not be military; any form of organized
effort for home country reform is included here. If successful, the
refugees will not only bring the refugee flow to an end but also lay
the groundwork for their own repatriation.
E. Pure Ideology
The anti-Communist admissions of the Cold War involved the
two previously mentioned foreign policy purposes of refugee reset-
tlement, but also contained what might be called a "pure"
ideological component: a belief, indeed an almost religious convic-
tion, that Communism is evil and that the U.S. should "save" as
many of its victims as possible. 13  Certainly, something like this faith
made it easier to justify the more instrumental measures just dis-
cussed, like embarrassing communist countries or attempting to
130. LOESCHER, supra note 102, at 116.
131. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 63-65. See also LOESCHER, supra note 102,
at 37 (discussing Nicaraguan contras based in Miami).
132. Cf Daniel J. Steinbock, Refuge and Resistance: Casablanca's lessons for Refugee Law, 7
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 696 (1993) ("[W]hile refuge is often the immediate answer to perse-
cution and other forms of oppression, resistance is usually the only ultimate solution to
these evils.").
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1952) (repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(7) (1980)) (es-
tablishing a "seventh preference" immigration admission category of up to 10,200 for
persons fleeing a communist-dominated country or one within the general area of the Mid-
dle East because of fear of persecution).
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lure their talented workers. In general, describing part of the world
as an "evil empire" makes it harder to deny access to that empire's
innocent sufferers.
What should be the role of ideology in the post-Communist era
of refugee resettlement?3 4 Are there value-based preferences for
resettlement policy that can trump other possible objectives, par-
ticularly rescue? Walzer, at least, would say yes, explicitly favoring
ideological ties, though not specifying the particular ideology.','
One wonders whether ideological resettlement's association with
the Cold War has not colored the whole question.
This issue cannot be considered in the abstract. "Ideological"
preferences in refugee selection must necessarily arise from a par-
ticular geopolitical and social context. Before September 11 the
most likely candidate for a favored group of victims probably would
have been vulnerable women.136 The dimensions of this category
are subject to differing views, but might include women with no
male protectors in rigidly patriarchal societies, domestic violence
victims without effective legal protection, or women objecting to
other cultural practices physically harmful or highly restrictive of
their life choices.13 The parameters of this priority would frankly
reflect American views of equality and would be the polar opposite
of cultural relativism, sheltering women suffering from practices
we abhor and reject. As with a bias towards those escaping Com-
munism, however, such a preference would only reach a fraction of
the people who fall within it.
After September 11, it may be said, the U.S. acquired a new ide-
ology: anti-terrorism.' Just what this means, and how the war
against terror will continue to unfold, is not clear. At present it is
impossible to identify the victims and/or refugees from this war
who might be appropriate for U.S. resettlement. Indeed, in the
wake of the September 11 attacks, refugee resettlement was essen-
tially stopped for several months, ostensibly to screen better for
terrorist infiltration (even though none of the men implicated in
the attacks had entered as refugees or had any other discernable
134. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and Security, 11 INTL.J. OF REFUGEE L. 1, 4 (1999) ("The
loss of ideology presents us with its own drfi. Can principles and commitment to human
rights survive? Will humanitarianism give way entirely to self-interest?").
135. See text accompanying supra note 82.
136. Frelick, supra note 4.
137. See e.g., UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, supra note 101,
at 54; Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 771, 804-
05 (1995); Fatin vs. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
138. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 29, 2002), in 38 wY. CoMP. PREs. Doc. 133 (Feb. 1, 2002), avail-
able at http://www/whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/1/20020129-1 1.htm.
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connection with refugee resettlement). 9 A more defensible reason
might have been to reassess priorities. Perhaps the U.S. will need to
shelter endangered opponents of particular terror groups,140 per-
sons singled out for their help in fighting terrorism, or those
uprooted by operations such as the attack on Iraq. Alternatively,
America could focus on the most miserable and oppressed, where
terrorism takes root.14 Wars tend to be all-consuming, gathering up
all available weapons and creating their own value systems. In a war
that demands as much commitment in troops, casualties, foreign
relations, and funding as this one already has (and will), it is unre-
alistic to think that refugee admissions will not also be used as a
weapon. If refugee resettlement appears helpful in the war against
terrorism it is sure to be called upon, even at the expense of other
people in greater need.
E Burden-Sharing
One reason for the U.S. to accept refugees for resettlement in-
volves refugee burden-sharing: the spreading of the burdens of
refugee flows, including the refugees themselves, among many
states. The issue arises from three inescapable facts. First, refugees
do not move evenly around the globe, both because refugee-
producing events are concentrated in particular countries or re-
gions, and because most refugees cannot seek sanctuary far from
their countries of origin.1 42 Second, despite the benefits individual
refugees might ultimately bring, refugee-receiving countries regard
refugees as an unwanted burden in just about every way imagin-
able.14 3 Third, countries vary widely in their abilities to cope with
refugees in their territory.
139. Frelick, supra note 4, at 28. This explanation is not to be confused with the possi-
bility that terrorists could be among asylum-seekers entering Western countries. See, e.g.,
RickJervis et. al., 7Trrorist May be Among Refugees Heading to Europe, WALL ST.J.,July 5, 2002, at
Al.
140. Killing of Doctors in Karachi, Pakistan (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 19,
2002) (discussing murders of Shi'ite physicians by Islamic extremists).
141. Stanley Hoffman, Clash of Globalizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRs,July-Aug. 2002, at 114.
142. See WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2002, supra note 6, at 2-3, 11.
143. Schuck, supra note 104, at 252 ("Each state ... possesses powerful disincentives to
provide relief, especially on its own territory. Such relief is costly to provide; at a minimum,
it includes food, clothing, shelter, and information. If the state does not allow the migrants
to come and go as they please, it must keep them in custody or under close surveillance. If
they remain in custody in close quarters and enforced idleness, the risks of violence, crime,
and other social pathologies are correspondingly great.").
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For these reasons, receiving countries have attempted to limit
their refugee responsibility by either barring entry to asylum-
seekers or ejecting those who manage to get inside their borders.
In order to preserve the right to asylum and protect against invol-
untary refoulement, both UNHCR and other countries have often
attempted to distribute the burden imposed on the host country,
through material and financial support and sometimes by third
country resettlement of its refugees. Refugee burden-sharing is
probably not yet a norm of international law,14 4 but it has been un-
dertaken in numerous refugee crises.
Two refugee groups of particular relevance are the Vietnamese
in Hong Kong from 1975 to the 1990's and the Kosovo Albanians
in Montenegro in 1999. The case of the Vietnamese fleeing their
homeland after 1975 illustrates how closely burden-sharing, par-
ticularly through resettlement, can bear on host countries'
willingness to provide asylum. From the start, countries in South-
east Asia receiving the bulk of the "boat people" fleeing Vietnam
-Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Indonesia
-were reluctant to allow them to land, fearing their indefinite
stay. Only after receiving assurances of both financial support and
the refugees' resettlement abroad did these countries agree to
grant even temporary asylum. 45 The U.S., a leader in orchestrating
and funding these agreements, had its own foreign policy reasons
for participating, 46 in addition to its more general interest in pro-
moting first country asylum. The resulting burden-sharing
relationship between the countries of first asylum and the reset-
tlement countries was remarkably direct. 47 If more refugees arrived
without a corresponding increase in resettlement departures, the
asylum countries quickly became more assertive in refusing entry.
In 1989 a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) by host and reset-
tlement countries attempted to bring refugee flight and asylum in
Hong Kong to a conclusion by a combination of enhanced reset-
tlement and an end to presumptive refugee status.1
8
In the case of the Kosovars fleeing ethnic cleansing in their
home province, the immediate refugee crisis was precipitated
144. Id. at 272. Peter Schuck calls burden-sharing a "weak norm" of international law.
145. Id. at 255-56; James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee
Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTs.J. 115, 143-44 (1997).
146. See text accompanying supra note 115.
147. Josh Briggs, Comment, Sur Place Refugee Status in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum
Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 433, 436-41 (1993).
148. Schuck, supra note 104, at 258-59; Arthur C. Helton, Judicial Review of the Refugee
Status Determination Procedure for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Case of Do Giau, 17
BROOK.J. INT'L L. 263, 266 (1991).
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when these refugees tried to enter neighboring Macedonia. Mace-
donia, which had serious security concerns about the arrival of
thousands of Kosovar refugees,'49 responded by barring their entry,
trapping thousands of refugees at the border crossing point for
several days without shelter or other assistance. While UNHCR was
reluctant to make asylum conditional on international burden-
sharing, the U.S. in particular was anxious to break the impasse.
Under its impetus, and with its financial, diplomatic, and logistical
support, thousands of refugees were evacuated from Macedonia.
Ultimately, 92,000 refugees were removed to twenty-nine resettle-
ment countries.150 After considering and rejecting forms of
temporary refuge, such as placement at Guantanamo Bay, the U.S.
accepted over 14,000 refugees through regular resettlement chan-
nels.151
As with the Vietnamese covered by the CPA, the U.S. acted for a
variety of motives. Washington had multiple interests in the Kosovo
conflict. One was a humanitarian desire to reduce suffering, par-
ticularly among a population for which it felt some special
responsibility. Having conducted the air strikes that set off the
crisis, the U.S. was obviously anxious to avoid bad publicity about
the results. In addition, the U.S. did not want to jeopardize the on-
going placement of NATO troops in Macedonia, a possibility if the
refugee influx became a problem for that country.153
In short, distributing refugee responsibility can be an important
element in securing the reality of asylum in countries of initial ref-
uge. Indeed, burden-sharing is a centerpiece of two recent
proposals for the reform of the international refugee regime.
9 4
Though they differ in how to allocate responsibility among states,
both proposals give resettlement a role in ensuring sanctuary for
refugees in their own regions. 5 Under the existing refugee relief
149. Michael Barutciski & Astri Suhrke, Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations
in Protection and Burden-Sharing, 14 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 95, 96 (2001). These included a
tipping of the ethnic balance between Slavs and Albanians within the country, the risk of
being dragged into the war, and the possibility of being stuck indefinitely with a huge refu-
gee population. Id.
150. Id. at 101.
151. U.S. COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 312.
152. See text accompanying supra note 120.
153. Barutciski and Suhrke, supra note 149, at 101.
154. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 145; Schuck, supra note 104. These proposals have
inspired some comment and critique. See e.g., Anker et al., Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hatha-
wa/Neve and Schuck 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295 (1998); Peter Schuck, A Response to the
Critics, 12 HARV. HuM. RTS.J. 385 (1999).
155. To summarize briefly Hathaway & Neve advocate regional "interest-convergence
groups" of states that would jointly provide the location and financing for temporary
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system, which is certainly more ad hoc in how it spreads the refugee
burden than these proposals would be, resettlement can be equally
critical. Valuable in itself for its positive influence on refugee pro-
tection, burden-sharing has also become a U.S. foreign policy
means of preserving asylum outside the U.S., particularly for fa-
vored groups.
V. TRADITIONAL IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
A. Family Ties to the U.S.
As a selection criterion, family ties to persons in the U.S. are the
polar opposite of need. Family ties, however, are the more favored
selection ground, with a larger number of admissions. For fiscal
years 1996-2000, almost 66,000 people were admitted under Prior-
ity One, while 127,000 were taken under family reunion Priorities
Three, Four, and Five.1 6 Additionally, family reunion probably
played some role in Priority Two cases as well, in selection of indi-
vidual refugees within the designated groups. Moreover, family ties
that would not provide the basis for admission to immigrants, or
that would only in a much slower timeframe, can be grounds for
immediate refugee admission.57 For this reason, some observers
have lamented that "[t]he overseas refugee admissions program
protection of refugees. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 154, at 188-90. If the conditions that
produced the refugee flight did not resolve within a set period of time, they advocate
resettlement for those refugees unable to repatriate. Id. at 185, 192. Even countries outside
the affected region are expected to offer resettlement opportunities. Id. at 192. Schuck
proposes the allocation of resettlement needs among states in a region according to their
burden-bearing capacity. Schuck, supra note 104, at 272. This allocation should, he
contends, be based mainly on national wealth. Id. at 279-80. Each state could, however, buy
its way out of its quota of temporary or permanent resettlement obligations. Id. at 283. This
market would of course allow richer states like the U.S. to pay poorer ones to fulfill their
resettlement duties. Id. at 285.
156. Refugee Data Center, supra note 92.
157. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 34-37. For example, under Priority Three,
spouses, unmarried children and parents of refugees, asylees, conditional residents, and
certain parolees already in the U.S. are admitted as refugees. They would not qualify as im-
migrants. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). Moreover, while
permanent residents could sponsor their spouses and unmarried sons and daughters, Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2), due to the backlog in applications the
ordinary immigration route for these relatives is much slower than admission as a refugee.
See John Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law:
Proposed Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253, 260 (1998) (describing delays in availability
of second preference immigrant visas); see also U.S Department of State, Visa Bulletin,
http://travel.state.gov/visabulletin.html (last visited May 4, 2003).
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often seems to function more as a family-based immigration cate-
gory... than a means of rescuing persons from persecution."' 8
There are four possible justifications for this favoritism. One is
the communitarian argument that the greatest concern is owed to
those most closely connected to Americans, and, relatedly, that in
constituting their community Americans are entitled to welcome
people who have a direct connection with the current popula-
tion.'59 Family reunion looms large as a purpose of American
immigration law generally,' ° and of international refugee law as
well.'8 ' Interestingly, though, the family reunion priorities for refu-
gee resettlement allow the "anchor" relative in the U.S. to be not
only a citizen but also a resident alien, refugee, asylee, conditional
resident, or a parolee.' 2 In other words, many of the people whom
the selected refugees are coming to join have a relatively tenuous
connection to this society themselves. In these cases the U.S. is not
so much continuing its community as relocating a foreign one.
A second, related, reason for favoring family members is as a
form of private advantage. Just as some alien admissions are de-
signed to help the country as a whole, some benefit individual
Americans or American organizations or constituencies. Such is
the case with immigration preferences based on family relation-
ships. Family reunion in refugee resettlement aims to confer a
boon on the receiving relatives, who may be relatively recent arri-
vals themselves for whom reestablishing family connections is very
important.
A third possible reason to accept persons with U.S. family ties
would be their greater ability to assimilate in American society.
158. Fitzpatrick & Pauw, supra note 17, at 763.
159. WALzER, supra note 82, at 41, 49.
160. See, e.g., Guendelsberger, supra note 157, at 254. Of the 660,477 legal immigrants in
FY 1998, 72% came on the basis of family relationships to U.S. citizens or resident perma-
nent aliens.
161. As the Final Act of the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refu-
gees and Stateless Persons,July 28, 1951, IV B, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 143, states:
Considering that the unity of the family, the natural and fundamental group unit of
society, is an essential right of the refugee....
Recommends Governments to take the necessary measures for the protection of the
refugee's family, especially with a view to:
(1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee's family is maintained, particularly in cases
where the head of the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for a particular
country... ."
162. See Priority Three, supra note 39.
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This of course is a factual question. Studies have shown that unac-
companied children who were resettled without a family member
"experienced a greater degree of disturbance than those who were
able to establish contact with at least one such relative within the
United States.' 63 For refugees in general, the existing literature
consistently stresses the importance of the family to adjustment
and the extent to which refugees seek to reconstruct family ties.
164
Similarly, the presence of their own ethnic community in the U.S.
can ease refugees' transition to America. 
6
5
The fourth justification, to use the term loosely, is that U.S. fam-
ily ties are relatively easy to administer as a basis for refugee
selection. There is no need to investigate country conditions, and
the relevant "witnesses" to the underlying facts are in the U.S.
While fraud is, of course, possible, it is probably less likely and eas-
ier to detect than in ordinary claims of feared persecution.
In some sense, however, the use of family ties in refugee reset-
tlement can be seen as an admission of defeat in efforts to protect
the vulnerable-a reversion to traditional immigration predilec-
tions when more need-based policies are too troublesome to
implement. At the least, family-based refugee selection evinces a
very weak commitment to assisting the most threatened.
B. Refugees Most Likely to Contribute
Once the U.S. opens up the possibility of choosing refugees on
the basis of their perceived benefit to American society (or indi-
vidual American residents), as with family and cultural
connections, it can consider whether the same principle applies to
refugees' prospective economic (or artistic, academic, cultural,
etc.) contributions. Defenders of refugee resettlement often point
to the achievements of individual refugees, and there certainly
have been some remarkable examples, starting with Albert
Einstein.' 6 This approach has historical precedent. In the period
163. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children into the United States, 7
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 137, 175 (1989) (citations omitted).
164. David W. Haines, Patterns of Refugee Resettlement and Adaptation, in REFUGEES IN
AMERICA IN THE 1990s 28, 45 (1996) ("[F] amilies ... are ... capable of easing many of the
problems of adjustment to the United States.").
165. Id. at 47.
166. 2001 The Year in Review, REFUGEES, Jan. 2002, at 20. See also Remarks of the Presi-
dent Upon Signing Executive Order 11,860 Establishing the Committee on Refugees From
Southeast Asia, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 531 (May 19, 1975) (trying to build support
for Vietnamese refugees in 1975, President Gerald Ford stated, "[t] hey are people of talent,
[VOL. 36:4
The Qualities of Mecy
after World War II, resettlement countries scrambled to gather
refugees with the "proper" skills,6 7 leaving behind a "hard core" of
the aged, infirm, disabled, and others considered to be economic
liabilities." s
Work skills or experience do not figure in current resettlement
priorities, except very indirectly where past employment with U.S.
entities is considered. Of course, family connections with U.S. citi-
zens, residents or prior entrants may imply higher than average job
skills, as may the kinds of people who are persecuted or are mobile
enough to flee their homes. 69 In theory however, there is no rea-
son why refugee applicants could not be screened for education,
work experience, English language ability, and other employment-
related attributes. Interestingly, today this screening would proba-
bly be viewed as unfairly giving precedence to domestic economic
considerations in obvious disregard of refugees' degree of need.
Selection based on talent also can damage refugee camps' social
structure.70 Although based on national interest as well, family or
cultural connections are for some reason deemed much more de-
fensible.
C. Cultural Ties
What role should cultural connections (ethnic, religious, or his-
torical) between the refugees and the receiving country play in
refugee selection? In other words, should there be a principle fa-
voring the admission of persons, otherwise meeting a threshold
level of eligibility, whose cultural background resembles that of
large segments of the present U.S. population? As a factual matter,
they are industrious, they are individuals who want freedom and I believe they will make a
contribution now and in the future to a better America"); Editorial, Tougher Policies on Refu-
gees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at A18 ("[P]rosperous countries like the United States and
Australia have found that refugees and their children can become among their most de-
voted and productive citizens.").
167. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 18, at 19-21; LouISE HOLBORN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 366-67
(1956). See Displaced Persons Act of 1948 § 5 (a) (giving priority to "farm laborers, physi-
cians, dentists, medical nurses, household, construction, clothing and garment workers; or
aliens possessing educational, scientific or technological qualifications.").
168. HOLBORN, supra note 167, at 481-92.
169. See HAINES, supra note 164, at 31 (Generally, "refugees come to the United States
with relatively high occupational skills and educational levels as compared with their compa-
triots in country of origin, if not always with the general American population or other
immigrant groups.").
170. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
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America seems to have taken that tack not only in applying the
Refugee Act and other legal devices to favor, for example, Cubans
over Haitians, 17' but in actually amending the Act to codify certain
"cultural" preferences.1 7 2 It must be said, however, that the favored
cultural linkages have resulted more from domestic political pres-
sure by members of ethnic/religious communities than from a
consideration of the philosophical fine points of cultural continu-
ity.
A fairly large literature examines the relative value of cultural
connection in immigration in general. 173 The question here is
whether different considerations apply to refugee resettlement.
When forced to choose among people in distress, many Americans
may lean towards "people like them" in a kind of conscious or un-
conscious affinity.17 4 Michael Walzer explicitly recommends such
partiality. 5 Selection of the culturally similar, it may also be said,
maintains cultural continuity (and minimizes cultural discontinu-
ity) in the larger society; such refugees may therefore be easier to
assimilate than groups with little or no history in the U.S., reducing
the friction that sharp cultural differences can sometimes pro-
duce. 76 In addition, even more perhaps than family ties, cultural,
ethnic, and religious affiliations are relatively easy to substantiate.
On the other hand, cultural connections, like family ties, are unre-
lated to need per se, and in some sense represent an abandonment
of the rescue premise of resettlement. Thus, when the Lautenberg
Amendment created presumptions of persecution for certain
Ukrainian, Soviet, and Vietnamese groups, 1 7 it was generally con-
171. Melissa Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism and Reparations: A Critique of the United States'
Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687, 715-16 (1993).
172. Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599 (D)(9), 103 Stat. 1195, 1261-62 (1989) amending 8
U.S.C.A § 1157 (1994 & Supp IV. 1998) to create a presumption of refugee status for Soviet
Jews and Pentecostals, active members of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox
Churches, and certain groups of Vietnamese. This legislation is commonly known as the
Lautenberg Amendment, after its sponsor.
173. WALZER, supra note 82. See, e.g., Jules L. Colemen & Sarah K. Harding, Citizenship,
the Demands of Justice, and the Moral Relevance of Political Borders, inJUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION
18, 18-62 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995);Jean Hampton, Immigration, Identity, and Justice, in
JusTICE IN IMMIGRATION 67, 67-93; Stephen R. Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture, in
JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 94-135.
174. Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Borde, inJUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION,
136, 137-40) (calling this "the problem of bounded caring"). "Membership in a commu-
nity-be it a family, a cultural grouping, or a nation--does seem to entail a special concern
for the welfare of other members." Id. at 139.
175. See text accompanying supra note 86.
176. For an extreme example, see Sarah Lyall, Lost in Sweden: A Kurdish Daughter is Sacri-
ficed, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A3 (father killed daughter who broke with Kurdish
traditions to pursue an independent life in Sweden).
177. See supra note 172.
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sidered to have favored cultural connections over refugees facing
greater hardship elsewhere in the world.
Selection by cultural connection also presents a practical prob-
lem: just what is culture? Is it national origin or race? The first
smacks of the old national origins quota system abandoned in
1965."8 Explicitly using race as a ground for refugee resettlement is
almost inconceivable, and it is hard to imagine a conscious effort
to tip the country's racial composition by this means. In any case,
what race does not have a link to present-day Americans?
That leaves factors like language, customs, or religion as cultural
indicators. English language ability is hard to find in most refu-
gees, though perhaps it could be a positive selection factor.
Similarity in customs is difficult to judge and hardly carries much
weight by itself. Interestingly, the strongest cultural element might
be religion. Congress has already demonstrated its special concern
for persecuted Christians and Jews in the Soviet Union through the
Lautenberg Amendment,7 and it is easy to imagine the U.S. refu-
gee program favoring these groups-in preference to others-if
they were persecuted elsewhere.
One can make too much of parsing the elements of "culture,"
however. There may be times that historical and cultural connec-
tions would provide, for most Americans, a satisfactory ground for
choosing one group of refugees over another. If the Nazis had oc-
cupied Britain in 1940, or Canada was overrun by a foreign power
today, it seems likely that citizens of these countries would receive a
disproportionate share of our concern. On the other hand, so-
called cultural connections can easily become an excuse not to de-
cide who are the most deserving, a convenient default, or a path to
a parochial, or even racist, narrowing of compassion.
VI. MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
Choosing among the criteria just discussed involves weighing in-
commensurate values-comparing apples to oranges one might say.
The wide range of public and scholarly opinion on refugee selec-
tion illustrates this dilemma. How can the needs of individual
refugees be weighed, for example, against the interests of the
178. Select Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and
the Nat'l Interest, Staff Report 161, 163-64 (1981).
179. See supra note 172.
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nation, or of some of its inhabitants? Phrased this way, these ques-
tions have no obvious resolution. Moreover, the balance among
them will vary with the circumstances of each refugee crisis and the
world politics of the time.
In these circumstances the designation of the decision-maker is
quite important, for that person or institution will resolve the
competing claims. As described above, refugee selection is now
largely an Executive branch responsibility, with non-binding input
from Congress and interested voluntary agencies. 18° Through
amending legislation, Congress could of course enlarge its role in
any number of ways.' 8' In another variation on decision-making
authority, Stephen Legomsky has suggested that an Independent
Refugee Board be delegated to set refugee admission numbers and
priorities.'8 2 While acknowledging that such a Board would need to
take account of foreign policy and other national interests, Legom-
sky sees its main advantage as giving greater emphasis to refugee
needs and human rights in the selection process.183
A second method of sharpening the choices would be to allocate
the overall refugee admissions quota among the various purposes
of refugee resettlement. Thus a certain percentage or number
would be devoted to the neediest refugees, another segment to
foreign policy, another to family reunion, and so on. This process
could be effected through legislation, or (more sensibly) in each
year's refugee determination. Its advantage is the explicit identifi-
cation of the aims being pursued, as well as the fact that each valid
purpose would get at least some admission slots. Separate pro-
grams, or allocations, would reduce the sub rosa competition
among the uses of refugee admissions, particularly foreign policy
and rescue purposes. The disadvantages, however, outweigh these
arguments. For one, separating the programs still ultimately re-
quires choice among the several competing uses of refugee
resettlement and provides no guiding principle to make that
choice. Secondly, it would inhibit flexibility in an area where pri-
orities are constantly shifting.
A third means of identifying criteria for refugee selection would
be to recognize some kind of overarching principle. Refugee selec-
180. See text accompanying supra notes 26-42.
181. For a thoughtful examination of the pros and cons of more detailed legislative
specification of refugee admissions, see Legomsky, supra note 17, at 703-08.
182. Id. at 708-13. This Board could also administer overseas refugee selection. Anker
and Posner proposed a Board for the Determination of Refugee Statues and Asylum that
would hold hearings on the appropriate allocation of overseas refugee admissions and re-
port its findings to Congress. Anker & Posner, supra note 21, at 79-81.
183. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 711.
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tion involves a choice among competing goods. In that sense, it
can be said that the "wrong" choices do not produce a great loss
because, after all, most of the refugees taken will be better off to
some degree, even if other people (or the U.S.) might have been
"more" better off if those others had been selected instead. The
question in overseas resettlement is much less about avoiding
negatives than about maximizing positives.
This suggests a principle by which to evaluate the relative value
of different criteria and methods for refugee resettlement: maxi-
mizing the beneficial impact on the endangered populations
and/or to the United States. 84 This suggestion might seem simply
another way of stating the issue, because reasonable people can
disagree about which consequences to measure and about the rela-
tive importance of the ones we choose. This principle does,
however, have a normative effect in identifying more and less wor-
thy aims of our overseas resettlement program. For one, it suggests
that satisfaction of the refugee definition (however loosely or strin-
gently administered) is not by itself enough to justify selection,
even though the individual refugee would benefit from resettle-
ment. Instead, the decision-makers need to assess what secondary
gains will flow from choosing a particular individual or-more
usually-group. In other words, we need to pay special attention to
what is on the "plus" side of the "refugee plus" equation.
A. Low Priority Bases for Refugee Selection
Looking at benefit maximization eliminates or puts at very low
priority certain bases for refugee selection. These include family
reunion other than between spouses or parents and their minor
children, as well as certain foreign policy purposes. In addition,
this Section considers, and rejects, the idea of choosing resettle-
ment candidates by lot.
184. One could argue that the benefit to be measured ought only be that received by
the endangered population. While this contention is certainly plausible, as discussed earlier,
there are two major problems with it. One is that it is an arbitrary resolution of the question
of what values ought to predominate, and, indeed, just what the purpose of a resettlement
program ought to be. Secondly, even on its own terms it can encompass refugee admission
for foreign policy purposes, since, at least arguably, such actions will eventually redound to
the freedom or safety of some foreign population. This was one argument in favor of pursu-
ing resettlement from, for example, Cuba and Vietnam.
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1. Family Ties-Overall benefit maximization dictates that the
only family ties that should be used as a basis for refugee selection
are those between spouses or parents and their minor children.
While it is certainly true that family reunion is an important goal
for refugees and their U.S.-based relatives, and that to some un-
specified degree it would aid the refugees' adjustment to American
society, these advantages pale in comparison to other possible ap-
plications of resettlement. These uses simply do not have enough
of a multiplier effect. In particular, family ties that would not give
rise to normal immigration preference, or that would do so but in
a much longer time frame, should not be grounds for selection.
Admittedly, this suggestion would conflict with some, if not most,
refugees' cultural views of family unity. The main point, though, is
that other uses of refugee resettlement outweigh the desires of
those who themselves have already been admitted to the U.S.
The degree of family connection that should be recognized in
normal U.S. immigration is itself subject to debate, with a trend
toward taking only nuclear family members.'8 While constitutional
rules do not control this issue, it is worth noting that constitutional
protection of family rights to reunion is limited to parent-minor
child and spousal relationships.'8 6 Refugee selection should be at
least as restrictive, given that family reunion is well accommodated
in general immigration law and that there are other demands on
U.S. admissions that can be met only through the refugee quota.
Refugee processing should not be the leading edge of family pref-
erence in American selection of new residents, as it has sometimes
been.' 87 Indeed, where it is so employed, it is hard not to conclude
that family ties are being used as a default-an easy way to choose
among otherwise undifferentiated masses.
Potential refugees generally should not be given preference over
other immigrants on family reunion grounds. Their U.S.-based
relatives ordinarily should employ the usual immigration prefer-
ences in bringing them here. However, when the potential refugee
is a spouse or minor child of the U.S.-based relative, the gains in
family support justify selection priority. This is particularly true for
refugee children, for whom being with a parent is especially cru-
cial.' 88 Aside from a parent-minor child or spousal connection,
185. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Law-
maker, 43 AM.J. COMP. L. 511, 511-13 (1995).
186. Guendelsberger, supra note 157, at 266.
187. See supra text accompanying note 39.
188. EVERETT M. RESSLER ET AL., UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND PROTECTION
IN WARS, NATURAL DISASTERS, AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS, 147-51, 326 (1988). In fact, for
unaccompanied children the value of family reunion may be strong enough that more ex-
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however, family connections between a potential refugee and a
relative in the U.S. should not be a consideration in refugee selec-
tion-though they could of course be grounds for a regular
immigrant petition if and when those qualifications are met.
2. Certain Foreign Policy Purposes-As discussed above, there are a
variety of possible foreign policy uses of refugee resettlement."'
Some certainly meet the standard of benefit maximization, most
notably refugee burden-sharing.' 90 Acceptance of refugees who
have cooperated with or assisted U.S. interests obviously has the
effect of not only helping those individuals but encouraging their
compatriots, and perhaps other people in other places, to render
similar assistance. While taking refugees whom the U.S. has "cre-
ated" may bring no tangible extra payoff,'9' it has the added benefit
of satisfying what is widely regarded as an important moral obliga-tion. 192
On the other hand, certain foreign policy objectives are unwor-
thy of valuable resettlement slots. As discussed above, embarrassing
a nation by demonstrating its citizens' willingness to flee is unnec-
essary in today's world, and, in any event, unlikely to be
accomplished through refugee resettlement.9 3 The fact is that
many millions of people would move to the U.S. if they could, for a
host of reasons. 94 Using refugee resettlement to undermine the
economic or social structure of a country is also an expensive (in
terms of the numbers needed) and probably fruitless task.
3. Lottery--Given the difficulty of assessing relative need, and
the perceived unfairness of using other grounds, the choice among
the qualified could be made by lot. In a variety of contexts, lotter-
ies are receiving increased attention as a fair way to dispense scarce
goods.195' In the immigration field itself, approximately 55,000
tended family connections-for example, grandparents--should be legitimate grounds for
refugee acceptance. See e.g., Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children into
the United States, 7YAtLE L. & POL'Y REv. 137, 195-96 (1989).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 113-155.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 142-53 and text accompanying note 202 infra.
191. This category tends to overlap with the previous one in that refugees we created
are often, though not always, people who have cooperated with U.S. activities.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 113-120.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
194. See supra note 13.
195. Lottery Offers California Teachers Cheap Housing (CNN television broadcast, June 22,
2001) (discussing distribution of public school subsidized housing to teachers in Silicon
Valley); Owen M. Kendler, Auction Theory Can Complement Competition Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcON. L. 153, 158-60 (2002) (FCC lottery to distribute spectrum rights for wireless phone
services); Lani Guinier, Democracy's Conversation: Beyond Winner TakeAll, THE NATioN,Jan. 23,
1995, at 88. (proposing admissions lottery among minimally qualified college applicants); 20
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diversity visas a year are distributed in a carefully regulated lot-
tery.'96 Diversity visas are designed to enhance the "regional
diversity" of immigration, and citizens in countries of high-
immigration to the U.S. are ineligible. Visas are allocated by re-
gion, but within each region there is a pure lottery among eligible
applicants., 7 Applicants for the diversity visa lottery must have a
high school education or comparable work experience. Individuals
may enter each year's lottery only once.'98
Adapting some of these principles to refugee selection might
produce a novel system in which all putative refugees who wanted
to be considered for resettlement would submit an application and
the designated number would be selected from the global pool.'99
The "winners" would then be screened to see if they met the refu-
gee definition and other qualifications. 9 One variation on this
proposal would be to direct the lottery at those who were first
found to be in a certain level of danger or hardship, producing a
more targeted lottery. The more widespread the eligibility, how-
ever, the less would be the utility, and temptation, of lobbying for
favored groups.
There are several potential logistical problems with a refugee
lottery. One is simply distributing application forms. It would be
difficult to fairly and comprehensively publicize the lottery, make
the applications available, and provide translation and writing ser-
vices for all who wanted to apply. Some refugees have no effective
mailing address, even in refugee camps, and others move. The fol-
low-up determination of refugee status would be logistically even
more difficult than it is now, because the winners could come from
anywhere in the world. Practical reasons, therefore, may require
limits on who may apply, which undercuts the point of a lottery.
More basic objections exist, however. The underlying moral as-
sumption of a lottery is that no refugee is more, or less, deserving
or useful than any other, whether it be for reasons of foreign pol-
U.S.C. § 8066 (1998) (admissions lottery for oversubscribed charter school places as a condi-
tion of federal funding of states' charter school programs).
196. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c).
197. For a general description of the diversity visa program and its origin, see THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET. AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, 290-92 (4th ed. 1998);
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 235-41 (3d ed. 2002).
198. 22 C.F.R. 42.33(a)(4).
199. There would be no reason to allocate these slots on a regional basis, as with diver-
sity visas, because this method assumes that refugees from one region are no more deserving
than those from any other part of the world.
200. In traditional asset allocation by lot, such as spectrum lotteries, the applicants are
first screened for the relevant qualifications and only the eligible ones are allowed to enter.
Kendler, supra note 195. Because with refugees there are so many potential entrants and
eligibility questions are so fact-intensive, this proposal reverses the usual order.
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icy, family connection, culture, politics-or even degree of risk.20'
This is also the strongest objection to a refugee lottery: that it ex-
presses no values whatsoever, other than that some refugees should
be resettled. Use of a lottery thus abandons any concern for the
neediest, as well as all other instrumental reasons for admitting
endangered foreigners. A lottery makes sense only when we have
no defensible criteria for choice.
B. High Priority Bases for Refugee Selection
Maximizing the impact of refugee resettlement means con-
sciously trying to leverage its use. Just how this works out in any
given year will depend upon developments in both global politics
and refugee conditions, but it does imply a more targeted ap-
proach. This Section presents four suggestions for maximizing the
beneficial impact of overseas refugee resettlement. These would
not necessarily account for a year's entire refugee quota when em-
ployed.
1. Burden-Sharing-The enhancement of asylum opportunities
through burden-sharing is the prototypical way to maximize the
benefits of refugee resettlement. American resettlement can en-
courage other countries' resettlement, as well as assure countries
of first asylum that they will not bear the refugee influx alone.2 To
return to the Kosovo example, U.S. acceptance of some 14,000
Kosovars was an integral part of the total international resettlement
of 92,000. Resettlement in the U.S. further ensured local protec-
tion of 250,000 other refugees in Macedonia, as well as
Macedonian cooperation with NATO military activities.2 0 3 While
there is always the danger, as UNHCR recognized in Kosovo, that
the possibility of burden-sharing will prompt the host country to
make initial asylum for clamoring refugees contingent on reset-
tlement by other states, thereby undermining basic non-refoulement
obligations, burden-sharing remains a worthy aim of refugee reset-
tlement. By admitting refugees from their first countries of asylum,
201. If, in fact, one of these factors (or others) was deemed of some importance, the
lottery could, in theory, be weighted accordingly.
202. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 26, at 7 ("U.S. pledges of reset-
tlement and support for the protection mandate of UNHCR encourage other nations to
provide first asylum to new arrivals and serve as an example to other resettlement nations.")
203. See supra text accompanying notes 149-151; Roger P. Winter, The Year in Review, in
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2000, 14, 17 (2000).
SUMMER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the U.S. can in certain circumstances enhance those nations' will-
ingness to accept and keep other refugees, thus leveraging the
benefits of refugee resettlement far beyond the numbers actually
taken.
2. Promoting Democracy and Human Rights--One way of minimiz-
ing refugee crises, not to mention improving conditions for people
who have not yet been displaced, is to confront conditions in the
country of origin-what have come to be called the "root causes"
of refugee flight. This is a complicated endeavor and no doubt is
easier said than done.0 4 The difficulties of one, or even several,
countries trying to influence another country's internal policies are
many, particularly through the use of overt action.05
One less confrontational approach is to encourage internal ad-
vocates working for democracy and human rights. Because such
activities can be highly dangerous, human rights workers are often
compelled to flee for their safety. Such victims of political persecu-
tion are the archetypical refugees, eligible for both asylum and
refugee resettlement. 20 6 These remedies, however, are purely reac-
tive. And while quite necessary as life-saving measures, asylum and
resettlement have the perverse effect of facilitating the exile (and
therefore often the neutralization) of regime opponents. It is true,
of course, that self-exiled activists are theoretically free to return,
and that some do, but the fact is that their acceptance of foreign
sanctuary can relieve political pressure on oppressive states.0 7
A better use of refugee admission slots for human rights propo-
nents would be to assure these advocates (and their families)
refugee resettlement before they are compelled to flee. The aim
would be to encourage their human rights efforts by giving them
some assurance of safety should their situation become too pre-
carious, without requiring them to leave first.
American diplomats, voluntary agency personnel, or even un-
dercover operatives would be responsible for identifying these
individuals and informing them of their potential refugee status.
Refugee designation would work like an immigrant visa, allowing
204. Schuck, supra note 104, at 261-62; Hathaway & Neve, supra note 154, at
134("[T]here is no evidence to date of an international commitment to intervene against
the root causes of refugee flows.").
205. On the legality of covert and nonviolent intervention in another nation's internal
affairs, see generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Non-
forcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
206. See ZoLBERG ET AL., supra note 71, at 269 (describing this category of person as "ac-
tivists").
207. Darst, supra note 129, at 243 (noting danger that "relocation will extend the 'ser-
vice life' of a repressive regime by ridding it of troublesome dissidents.")
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the individual to enter the U.S. and remain, though without the
usual time limitations on visa use. If it succeeded, this technique
could improve the human rights situation in the country of ori-
gin-a good in itself-and potentially decrease the likelihood of
forced migration. This use of refugee admission could be accom-
plished at very little cost (since the slots might never be used) and
potentially have a much greater impact than just taking endan-
gered refugees who have already escaped.
This proposal also carries some risks. One is that people would
be just active enough to receive their "letters of transit °20 8 and then
quickly depart, which would actually exacerbate the exile phe-
nomenon mentioned above. Secondly, the offending government
could accuse its opponents of acting only out of personal desires to
emigrate to the U.S., and not for the good of their compatriots.
This criticism would be particularly acute if it were known that the
particular activist had in fact received a refugee admission promise.
Third, this practice might compromise the ability of U.S. diplomats
and other Americans to move freely in the country and meet with
the political opposition. It also might poison already strained dip-
lomatic relations between the U.S. and the host country. With
potential problems of this sort, it would be advisable to try this
kind of pre-emptive or proactive refugee selection on a small scale
to see how it worked before making it a large part of the overseas
refugee program.
One variation of this idea would be to give a promise of reset-
tlement to refugees already in camps outside their countries of
origin on the condition that they return to work against the perse-
cution or other conditions that caused them to flee in the first
place. If their efforts failed or became too risky, they would have
resettlement to fall back on. Promoting return to countries of po-
tential persecution, of course, could be quite dangerous and would
not be appropriate for every situation. It is also open to the criti-
cism of being too manipulative-of coercing participation by
putting a price on refugee status. 209 "Freedom fighters" are often
given U.S. incentives, and in circumstances of limited choice it is
not so farfetched to favor people who have made the effort to rid
their country of the oppression that made them refugees in the
first place. To the extent their actions reduce oppression, here
208. This phrase is taken from the film Casablanca. See Steinbock, supra note 132, at
656-57 (describing the letters of transit, which were essentially exit visas leading to asylum in
the U.S., as a "sort of bearer bond for freedom").
209. Another objection is that directing refugee places to those who take action against
oppressive conditions in their homelands would, in effect, favor men over women.
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again refugee selection would have a multiplier effect. Given the
risks involved, however, this use of refugee resettlement would have
to be conducted carefully.
3. Concentrating the Impact-As things stand now, most people
chosen by the U.S. refugee resettlement program are taken from
refugee camps in the designated countries and regions. 2 ' Given
the way processing is conducted, this may mean that a minority of
people-sometimes just a handful-will be taken from any given
camp or refugee settlement. Moreover, the impact of the process-
ing priorities tends toward "creaming" off the best and brightest
refugee camp inhabitants.21 The degree to which a refugee camp
can ever be a "community" is debatable,2 but there is no question
that departure of the most talented can undermine its social struc-
ture. The author observed this himself while working as education
coordinator in Khao I Dang, the largest Cambodian refugee camp
in Thailand in 1980-81. With each overseas resettlement selection
a segment of teachers and administrators would abruptly but hap-
pily depart, leaving disruption in the schools and dismay among
the remaining students and teachers. Serious depression among
those left behind, survivors of the Pol Pot era, was common in the
wake of these events, and camp morale never fully recovered.
To minimize these effects, resettlement opportunities can be
concentrated on whole, discrete refugee populations, or at least
entire camps. This would not only give these groups whatever
benefits refugee resettlement normally provides but would prevent
the spillover harms just described. In some cases it could even re-
213
solve an entire refugee situation.2 Additionally, concentrated
selection would minimize the cost and practical problems of inter-
viewing and choosing those to be taken. The more focused the
process is on fewer locales the more efficient it will be.
210. The discussion that follows does not apply to the acceptance of refugees directly
from their own countries. See infra notes 217-20.
211. Bill Frelick, Humanitarian Evacuation from Kosovo: a Model for the Future?, in WORLD-
WIDE REFUGEE INFO. (2000) (arguing that this leaves countries of first asylum "with the
'residuals'-the unskilled, the unhealthy, the uneducated-those most threatening or bur-
densome to local communities.").
212. On the controversy over whether refugees living in temporary exile, particularly in
camps, form a community in any meaningful sense of the word, compare Gervase Coles,
Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373 (Gil
Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1990) with UNHCR Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection
and Care 32-34 (1994).
213. For example, prior to the attack on Iraq in spring 2003, Bill Frelick urged reset-
tlement of 5,000 Iraqi refugees living in a squalid camp in Saudi Arabia, the remainder of a
group of 33,000 Shi'a Iraqis who fled after their uprising in 1991. Frelick, supra note 4, at 31.
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It may sound cruel to suggest that some refugee populations or
camps be targeted while others are ignored totally, but refugee
admissions have never been "fair" or open to all. South American
and African refugees, for example, have been slighted since before
the Refugee Act of 1980 went into effect, and the regional designa-
tions themselves skew admissions. Second, as this Article has
consistently tried to demonstrate, wrenching choices inhere in the
whole process, and a theoretical wide eligibility coupled with a
small number of actual selections is no favor to anyone. The idea
of concentrating selection where it will do the most good, and the
least harm, is a more rational and no less fair response.
4. Finding the Most Threatened-As discussed above, many view
rescuing persons currently at greatest risk of persecution or other
serious harm as the highest and best use of U.S. refugee resettle-
ment.214 While such a priority does not have the secondary benefits
of the other suggestions in this Section, it does have the virtue of
making the most dramatic changes to the lives of the refugees who
are thus accepted. In that sense, it maximizes the direct gains of
each refugee slot allocated.
A renewed focus on finding the refugees most in need of reset-
tlement has at least two implications. One is simply a greater effort
to identify and process these individuals. At present, the U.S. relies
on UNHCR for referrals of Priority One cases. "UNHCR, however,
often lacks the resources to devote to resettlement, and agency
staff in field offices sometimes feel that their own priorities become
distorted by demands from resettlement countries. ,215 As Bill
Frelick suggests, UNHCR recommendations could be augmented
by those from U.S. diplomatic personnel, who in turn can be ad-
vised by nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff.216 Indeed,
NGO staff working directly with refugees in countries of first asy-
lum seem ideally situated to discover the most pressing cases.
Because these relief workers have their regular duties to perform,
the U.S. could pay for additional NGO personnel whose main re-
sponsibility would be to identify threatened individuals.
If the U.S. is serious about resettling persons most at risk,
though, refugee selection should look outside the refugee camps
where most processing now takes place. Instead, the U.S. should
increase efforts to rescue persons still facing persecution, most of
214. See supra text accompanying notes 92-111.
215. Frelick, supra note 4, at 30.
216. Id. Frelick also suggests that resettlement countries such as the U.S. pay for more
UNHCR protection officers, who do the initial refugee status interviews and paperwork.
SUMMER 2003] 1003
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
whom are still in their homelands. In resettlement argot this is
called "in-country processing." It has been used in the past, mainly
with Vietnamese (Orderly Departure Program) from 1980-94 and
Soviet Jews and Evangelical Christians from 1988-98.17 Refugees
have also been taken directly from Haiti and Cuba.
In-country processing has the advantage, for the refugees, of not
requiring dangerous travel (in boats, in the Vietnam, Haiti and
Cuba examples) and of assuring, prior to departure, entrance to
the U.S. Its main benefit for the U.S. is that it keeps unsuccessful
applicants at home, with the attendant social and financial savings.
The main disadvantage is that the country of persecution controls
access to the escape route and therefore who even gets to apply for
processing. 9 The authorities can thereby learn who applies, possi-
bly exposing refugee applicants to greater danger or otherwise
making their lives more difficult. 20 When the home country does
not currently see the applicant population as much of a threat, this
is not a serious problem, as the Vietnamese and Soviet examples
show, but in other circumstances in-country processing would be
perilous or inadvisable.
Nevertheless, a resettlement program devoted to rescuing the
most desperate should be willing to take some chances beyond
what is bureaucratically comfortable. If the U.S. is going to save
victims of on-going persecution in their own countries, it may need
to reach out in unconventional ways. This might mean using more
clandestine methods of identifying and processing applicants than
having them publicly present themselves at the doors of the U.S.
embassy. If these people are in as much danger as the rescue the-
ory supposes, the U.S. resettlement program should be willing to
meet them at least half way. In-country selection will never be a
complete substitute for refugee processing in countries of asylum,
and certainly not for asylum application in the U.S. itself,221 but as a
217. Raufer, supra note 109, at 245-52; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Techniques for
Managing High-Volume Asylum Systems, 81 IowA L. REV. 671,682-84 (1996).
218. Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: Refu-
gees, Immigration and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 673, 718-21 (1995); Bill Frelick,
Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection, 26
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 675 (1993).
219. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 26, at 50.
220. Id. at 49.
221. The major objection to in-country refugee processing comes when it is imposed as
a substitute for allowing access to U.S. asylum adjudication, as was done with Haitians in
1991. See Raufer, supra note 109, at 251-61; Frelick, supra note 218, at 689-92. This concern
is not implicated by the suggestion here to increase its use in ordinary overseas refugee
processing, which is generally a supplement to, not a substitute for, asylum application.
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means to protect the most vulnerable it could provide a useful ad-
junct to those routes to refugee status.
VII. CONCLUSION
The admissions slots currently available to "refugees of special
humanitarian concern to the United States" can be seen less as a
form of refugee relief than as a visa bonanza to be awarded by the
Executive branch outside the rigid constraints of normal immigra-
tion law. It is therefore understandable that this pool of admissions
places would be tugged in several different directions. Foreign pol-
icy and rescue can both be legitimate uses of refugee resettlement.
The problem is that these potentially conflicting purposes compete
for a limited, and largely fixed, pool of admissions. Moreover,
though the number of resettled refugees is not small in absolute
terms, it pales in comparison to need, however conceived.
This disparity may have the perverse effect of freeing decision-
makers from having to pay serious attention to the highest and best
uses of overseas resettlement, in the implicit belief that their selec-
tion will have no significant effect on the underlying problems
anyway. To some degree, this makes it more palatable to give in to
bureaucratic or political pressures, and even to allow traditional
immigration concerns to work their way into a resettlement pro-
gram for refugees.
Refugee admissions will never approximate the number of op-
pressed, endangered, or suffering people in the world, and only
separation into several distinct programs would eliminate the
competition for existing refugee admissions among the differing
purposes it serves. Even such a restructuring would not eliminate
the necessity of choice, however.
This Article has proposed a more modest reorientation: a
greater emphasis on maximizing the benefits-to the U.S., to the
accepted refugees, and to the populations from which they are
taken-of refugee selection. Attention to benefit maximization
moves beyond rivalry among the various potential aims of refugee
resettlement and toward a more practical and flexible focus. For
the most part, this approach needs to be worked out year-by-year
and situation-by-situation, but some general priorities and methods
can be applied on a regular basis.
On the one hand, certain foreign policy purposes of refugee re-
settlement and most uses of family ties should be rejected as
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selection criteria. The Article also dismisses the idea of a refugee
lottery. On the other side of the equation, the Article encourages
the use of refugee resettlement in two contexts: refugee burden-
sharing with other countries and the promotion of democracy and
human rights in countries of origin. It also recommends that the
impact of refugee selection be concentrated, so that whole camps
or communities are resettled rather than dispersing selection
widely over populations and regions. Finally, the Article urges
more active efforts to rescue the people most immediately and se-
riously threatened.
Admittedly, these proposals do not always resolve the conflict
among the various uses of refugee resettlement. Nor do they com-
pletely answer the more profound underlying questions of which
of the world's millions suffering, oppressed, or endangered people
the U.S. should reach out and receive. They try, instead, to make
more rational use of a scarce resource, one that is valuable to both
giver and recipient.
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